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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Irish economy is facing extremely challenging times. It is in the 
throes of a deep recession, unemployment is rising rapidly and the Irish 
banking system is facing serious funding difficulties. As a consequence, by 
the end of 2010 output per head will have fallen back to its 2001 level. 
Nonetheless, our analysis suggests that the potential growth rate of the 
economy is around 3 per cent a year. Given the very severe recession that 
Ireland is currently experiencing, this means that when the world economy 
eventually recovers the Irish economy can be expected to experience a 
period of above average growth. On this basis, output per head could be 
restored to its 2007 level by the middle of the next decade. Consistent with 
this forecast, our estimates suggest that there will be a permanent loss of 
output of 10 per cent compared to where the economy might have been. 
This will represent a very painful permanent “scar” on the economy arising 
from the current recession. 
 
The dramatic deterioration in the public finances in 2008 and the early 
months of 2009 exposed the scale of the structural deficit – the deficit in 
the public finances which would remain even after a world recovery unless 
fiscal action is taken to close it. This structural deficit largely reflects the 
legacy of unwise fiscal policies in recent years. The experience of Ireland in 
the 1980s and of many other countries since then, suggests the importance 
of taking early action to tackle such a fiscal crisis. The budgets of 2009 and 
the budget promised for 2010 are together likely to halve the size of the 
structural deficit to 3 to 4 per cent of GDP. This seems to us to be an 
appropriate fiscal policy response to the very serious public finance 
problems. However, it will be very important that there is no slippage in 
the main parameters of the budget planned for 2010. 
 
Our assessment is that if the world economy recovers significant 
momentum by 2011, the Irish economy, as long as it regains 
competitiveness, can be expected to grow quite rapidly in the 2011-2015 
period, recovering some of the lost ground of the current recession. Under 
these circumstances the economy could temporarily grow at an average of 
over 5 per cent a year to 2015. If this happened, the unemployment rate 
would be reduced from a peak of around 17 per cent in 2010 to between 6 
and 7 per cent by 2015. 
 
If the world recovery were delayed a year to 2012, we estimate that the 
permanent loss of output and income could be closer to 15 per cent, the 
turnaround in the unemployment rate would be further delayed and there 
would be higher emigration. This would also lead to a higher structural 
budget deficit in which case further tough budgetary action from 2011 
onwards would be appropriate.  
 
IX 
X RECOVERY SCENARIOS FOR IRELAND 
In addition to action on fiscal policy, the authorities have taken steps to 
help stabilise the banking sector. Our analysis suggests that the long-term 
cost to the State of the necessary additional action to deal with the problem 
may be small relative to the debts accruing as a result of borrowing to fund 
the normal activities of the government. However, even if the funding 
needs of the banking system are eventually largely repaid, the full resolution 
of this problem will take some considerable time. In the interim the very 
substantial overhang of debt needed to fund a solution to the banking 
problems will add to uncertainty and to the risks facing the economy.  
 
The uncertainty arising from the crisis in the financial system would 
argue for continuing action to tackle the structural deficit over the period 
2011-15. The objective should be to eliminate the structural deficit by 2015. 
While this will require the maintenance of a tight fiscal policy over the 
period, it will be a much less severe policy stance than we are currently 
experiencing. It would also be less severe than the prospective budgetary 
policy envisaged as being necessary by the Department of Finance for the 
period 2011-13 in its Macro-Economic and Fiscal Framework: 2009-13.  
 
The analysis in this paper highlights the importance of improving the 
competitiveness of the Irish economy – this is essential if the economy is 
to return to full employment within a reasonable time scale. We envisage a 
major reduction in the level of costs, including labour costs, relative to the 
Euro Area over the period 2009-11. In this context, it is important that 
public policy should do all that it can to speed this essential adjustment. A 
revised partnership agreement which recognised the importance of 
reducing costs, broadly defined, would help in this regard.  
 
The Irish economy faces a period of very high unemployment. It will be 
very important that public policy learns from past research in Ireland and 
elsewhere on how best to prevent the unemployed of today becoming the 
long-term unemployed of tomorrow. This problem will be particularly 
acute for those losing their jobs who have relatively low levels of education 
and skills. This suggests that priority needs to be given to labour market 
initiatives that will effectively tackle this skills deficit among many of the 
unemployed. In preparing for a recovery, the economy would also benefit 
from increased policy attention to measures to enhance productivity and 
innovation in the tradable sector of the economy. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The exceptional nature of the recession which the world is currently 
experiencing inevitably has very serious consequences for an economy that 
is as open as Ireland’s. However, the problems for the domestic economy 
have been greatly aggravated by past policy mistakes, which allowed a 
major property market bubble to develop (and burst), permitted the 
banking system to become overexposed to this dangerous development 
and financed a structural expansion of the public sector with cyclical taxes.  
 
While the legacy effects of past policy mistakes make things much worse 
in Ireland than they would otherwise have been, it is important to 
recognise that up to a half of Ireland’s current problems with the public 
finances and in the labour market arise from the global financial and 
economic crisis – they would have happened anyway no matter how 
appropriate fiscal policy had been over the last decade.1 This diagnosis of 
the current Irish economic crisis has important implications for how best 
to tackle the problems. The consequences of past policy mistakes have to 
be addressed by very painful reforms, while the domestic consequences of 
the world recession will be largely corrected by a world recovery. 
 
Though today’s economic problems are exceptional, the basic fabric of 
the economy remains reasonably intact. Provided that the world economy 
finds its way back to reasonable growth over the next two years, the Irish 
economy can be expected to follow. The task of policymakers is to prepare 
the economy so that it will be in a position to benefit from a world 
recovery and to ensure that the lag between the world recovery and its 
translation into Irish growth in output and employment is minimised.  
 
The dramatic fall in output that has occurred must still be translated 
into an actual fall in living standards if the economy is to remain 
competitive. In the past, such adjustments have sometimes been attained 
by a devaluation of the Irish currency. With Ireland in the Euro Area, this 
is no longer possible. Instead, the adjustment must now involve acceptance 
of a fall in nominal wage rates across much of the economy, and budgetary 
measures to restore the public finances to a sustainable path. By 2010 
output per head (using GNP) will have fallen to roughly the level it was in 
2001. Over the past number of months, the Irish population has begun to 
feel the impact of the recession – the impact has been relatively modest for 
those with guaranteed incomes (e.g., employees and pensioners with 
unchanged salaries), but has been acute for people who have lost jobs, 
whose businesses have closed, or whose pensions are at risk.  However, 
further adjustment is required by those in employment, as our changed 
 
1 As discussed in this paper our estimate is that prior to the budget of April 2009 roughly 
half of the government deficit was structural. This structural deficit is almost wholly due to 
past mistakes in fiscal policy. 
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financial circumstances must involve the acceptance of a fall in nominal 
wage rates across much of the economy.  There will also be the impact on 
living standards of the implementation of a series of tough budgets to 
restore the public finances to a sustainable path. The government’s 
supplementary budgets in 2009 represent an appropriate first step in this 
adjustment process. 
 
As a result of the recession, the Irish economy today suffers from four 
major challenges which have to be addressed. These are: 
• The restoration of order to the banking system, 
• The structural re-balancing of the government accounts,  
• The correction of the serious loss of competitiveness, which the 
economy experienced between 2003 and 2008, reflected in the 
burgeoning balance of payments deficit, and 
• The economic and social consequences of the related dramatic 
increase in the unemployment rate. 
 
As a result of the bubble in the property market, the building and 
construction sector grew to be more than twice the size that would have 
been sustainable. To achieve this remarkable level of output it effectively 
squeezed out a significant part of the tradable sector of the economy. With 
the building and construction sector now dramatically reduced in size, the 
restoration of full employment in the economy will require a significant 
expansion in the tradable sector of the economy. This will only be possible 
with an improvement in competitiveness. 
 
The current recession has led to a very serious deterioration in the 
public finances. In 2006 the general government balance was in surplus to 
the tune of 3 per cent of GDP; by 2008 this had shifted to a deficit of over 
7 per cent and, without the government’s corrective fiscal actions it could 
have widened to 15 per cent or more in 2009. Despite the fact that the 
Irish economy’s net debt position at the end of 2008 stood at just 20 per 
cent of GDP,2 the speed of deterioration has led to a reassessment of Irish 
government debt risk on international markets.  
 
In a recession the public finance position normally deteriorates through 
the operation of the so-called automatic stabilisers (higher unemployment 
leads to higher welfare payments, lower tax revenues etc.). To the extent 
that these automatic stabilisers are responsible for the deterioration, they 
can be expected to unwind in a recovery. However, it has long been clear 
that the dramatic deterioration in the public finances owes much to the 
collapse in the property market bubble and that, as a result, no recovery is 
likely to restore some of the major areas of lost government revenue.  
 
The key question for policymakers in 2009 is to determine how much of 
the deficit is structural and how much is cyclical (driven by the recession). 
Prior to the April Supplementary Budget we estimated that the structural 
deficit was of the order of 6 to 8 per cent of GDP. When the April 
 
2 This figure nets off savings funds (National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF), Social 
Insurance Fund (SIF) etc.) and deposits with the Central Bank which at the end of 2008 
were especially large.  
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Supplementary Budget is taken into account, and assuming the 
government’s budget outline for 2010 is fully implemented, we estimate 
that it will lie in the range 3 to 4 per cent of GDP.3 While the country is 
facing an exceptionally deep recession in 2009, provided that a world 
recovery sets in during 2010 and 2011, Ireland has the opportunity to 
restore some of the ground lost during the recession.   
 
This paper examines the possible scenarios to bring the Irish economy 
to recovery over the period to 2015. Depending on the nature of the world 
recovery and its timing, it should be possible to restore the economy to a 
sustainable growth path within two or three years and to address the critical 
rise in unemployment by the middle of the next decade. If appropriate 
policies are followed it shows that, with a reasonable recovery in the world 
economy, output per head, which will fall to the 2001 level in 2010, could 
have returned to its pre-recession 2007 level by around 2014 or 2015.  
 
Following on from the series of budgetary measures introduced for 
2009, this paper suggests that it will be important to implement the budget 
for 2010 along the broad lines already announced by the government. In 
exploring alternative scenarios, either less benign or more benign, this 
paper suggests that the current stance of fiscal policy can be seen as a “no 
regrets policy” – even if the world recovery were delayed by a year (or 
proved more robust than assumed) current policy would prove to be 
broadly appropriate. Finally, the paper suggests that preconditions for a 
successful recovery will be the restoration of order to the Irish banking 
system and the achievement of a significant improvement in the 
competitiveness of the economy. 
 
Even with a world recovery beginning in 2011, the current recession is 
likely to result in a permanent substantial loss of output of the order of 10 
per cent relative to what was envisaged in the Benchmark Scenario of the 
Medium-Term Review 2008-2015. Were the recovery to be delayed for an 
additional year, this loss would be of the order of 13 per cent. In addition, 
we estimate that the  costs to the exchequer in relation to the banking 
crisis, even if they will eventually be largely recouped from the proceeds of 
asset sales, could imply an increase in government interest payments in the 
region of 2 percentage points of GDP per annum out to 2015 and beyond. 
 
Section 2 of this paper considers the background to the current crisis. It 
also considers the experience of major shocks elsewhere. Section 3 looks at 
three major medium-term challenges facing the Irish economy. The first is 
the banking crisis and its likely effect on the national debt. The second is 
the scale of the structural deficit facing the authorities. The third is the 
financial sustainability of the current crisis and anticipated rise in public 
sector debt. Section 4 will consider alternative scenarios on world recovery 
and how they will impact on the Irish economy. Conclusions are drawn in 
Section 5. 
 
 
3 This does not allow for any long-term costs from the reform of the banking system. 
2. BACKGROUND TO 
THE CURRENT CRISIS 
The Irish economy enjoyed an exceptional period of sustained growth 
from 1994 through to the early years of this decade. This growth was 
driven by the expansion in world trade and the very competitive nature of 
the Irish economy. The result was a rapid increase in world market share 
for Irish exports at a time when world trade was also rising fast. This 
produced a rapid but sustainable growth in Irish output and living 
standards. 
2.1  
Domestic 
Origins – 
Property 
 
By the late 1990s, as unemployment fell to historically low levels, the 
economy found itself approaching capacity output. Substantial immigration 
helped relieve labour market pressures (Barrett, Fitz Gerald and Nolan, 
2002) but it was clear that growth could not continue at the same rate 
indefinitely. The natural mechanism to slow the economy was a real 
appreciation of the currency. In the absence of an independent exchange 
rate this had to take place through a loss of competitiveness as wage rates 
and other prices rose more rapidly than in the rest of the Euro Area. 
Managing this real appreciation through differential inflation was never 
going to be easy without overshooting. It would have been better, as 
argued by the EU Commission in 2001 (and also by Barry and Fitz Gerald, 
2001), if fiscal policy had been tightened to slow the process.  
 
However, the bursting of the dotcom bubble did slow the world 
economy and hence the Irish economy. This slowdown was less severe 
than had been initially expected and it effectively provided some breathing 
room for the Irish economy. 
 
Its particular demographic structure meant that Ireland entered the 
boom period under-endowed with infrastructure in the form of dwellings.  
The numbers of adults per dwelling was substantially higher than in the 
other EU member states (with the exception of Spain). The rapid rise in 
incomes together with the increased availability of low cost finance as a 
consequence of EMU membership and the globalisation of the financial 
sector resulted in a boom in the building and construction sector. In its 
early stages this rapid expansion in house building was both sustainable and 
desirable: people wanted and could afford dwellings. However, from 2003 
onwards the housing boom entered a phase that was unsustainable 
constituting a growing “bubble”. In contrast to the earlier years where 
growth was driven by exports, the housing boom drove economic growth 
over the following years so that the level of actual output rose well above 
the potential of the economy to deliver in a sustainable manner. 
 
Fitz Gerald, 2001, and Barry and Fitz Gerald, 2001, recommended that 
the tax system be used to prevent the development of a housing bubble. 
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Again in 2003 in the Medium-Term Review: 2003-2010 (pp. 84-85) we warned 
of the need for policy action to prevent over-heating in the property sector 
of the economy. This refrain was repeated in many subsequent reports. 
The effect of the massive expansion in the building and construction sector 
was the crowding out of the tradable sector of the economy (Morgenroth 
and Fitz Gerald, 2006). Wage rates were driven up across the economy by 
the rapid growth in labour demand in the building and construction sector 
and, as a consequence, firms that were dependent on export markets 
suffered. In effect, the building and construction sector “crowded out” the 
rest of the economy, especially the tradable sector.  
 
This domestic imbalance as a result of the building and construction 
boom began to be reflected in the balance of payments. Having run a 
surplus on the current account over the export-led boom years, a growing 
deficit emerged. The combination of EMU membership and the 
globalisation of financial markets meant there was less concern about such 
a phenomenon than there would have been in the past. It was seen as being 
easily financeable. To finance the housing boom the banking sector 
borrowed extensively abroad so that the net foreign liabilities of the 
banking system rose from a low of 10 per cent of GNP in 2003 to over 60 
per cent of GNP by 2007.  
 
The boom in the building and construction sector was only made 
possible through the availability of ready finance from the banking sector. 
The potential exposure of the banks to the property market was clearly 
underestimated by the regulatory authorities. These dangers were only 
becoming apparent to those outside the financial system from late 2005 
onwards (Fitz Gerald et al., 2005 and Traistaru-Siedschlag, 2007). 
Appropriate regulatory action could have reduced the dangers of a banking 
crisis. Such action could have helped control the property market bubble, 
but it would also have required a much more activist fiscal policy stance 
over the course of the current decade. 
 
 From a healthy competitive position at the start of EMU with high 
productivity, relatively strong cost competitiveness and a relatively weak 
exchange rate the Irish economy has more recently suffered a significant 
loss of competitiveness. This loss of competitiveness was reflected in the 
increasing deficit on the current account of the balance of payments in 
recent years. The most recent report of the National Competitiveness 
Council (NCC) has highlighted the competitiveness challenge facing the 
Irish economy. The NCC report for 2008 finds that Ireland’s trade 
weighted exchange rate has appreciated by 18 per cent since 2000 making 
Irish goods and services more expensive on international markets. 
2.2 
Competitive-
ness and  
Unemploy-
ment 
 
This deterioration in competitiveness in recent years is primarily a result 
of the labour market pressures exerted by the growing bubble in the 
property market and the building sector of the economy. However, other 
inefficiencies, including a lack of competition in key areas of the economy, 
also contributed to the problem. The exceptionally tight labour market in 
the period to 2007 saw wage rates and other prices rise very rapidly, 
although there are significant differences across sectors with the loss of 
competitiveness proving more severe in low-productivity, non-
manufacturing sectors of the economy (NCC, 2009). This problem 
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particularly affected the non-tradable sector resulting in higher domestic 
prices for services as well as increased labour costs (Siedschlag, 2008). 
 
To undo the consequences of this loss of competitiveness and to 
improve the situation sufficiently to attract new business will require a 
substantial reduction in relative costs, especially labour costs. Within EMU 
this must take place through changes in nominal wage rates in Ireland 
relative to the rest of the Euro Area. Because nominal wage rates are 
currently rising very slowly in the Euro Area, such an improvement in 
competitiveness can only be achieved quickly by a reduction in nominal 
wage rates in Ireland. Such reductions in nominal wage rates are crucial if 
the economy is to be restored to full employment. 
 
While previous research on the labour market would suggest that wage 
rates are relatively flexible, we have no experience of such flexibility where 
falling prices would warrant cuts in nominal wage rates. In addition, 
international evidence suggests that it normally takes a number of years for 
wages to adjust to a new equilibrium. Thus, while instantaneous adjustment 
to the appropriate level of wage rates would be very desirable for Ireland, 
in terms of minimising the cost of the recession, it is likely to take some 
time. The longer that the adjustment is delayed, the higher will be the 
eventual cost in terms of lost output and higher unemployment. There are 
signs that wage rates are falling in some parts of the private sector but it 
will be some time before the extent of the pace of change becomes clear in 
published data. 
 
Private sector wage rates are not a policy tool available to the 
government as they are set on the market. Research in the 1990s suggests 
that the partnership process has not had a long-term impact on the 
outcome for private sector wage rates (Fitz Gerald, 1999). However, it is 
possible that the partnership process may impact on the rise in nominal 
wage rates over a limited period. A renegotiation of the current partnership 
agreement to reflect the dramatic fall in prices that is underway and the 
deterioration in labour market prospects since September could prove 
helpful and it would be in the spirit of the partnership process. Arguably, 
the potential to increase the speed of labour market adjustment, reducing 
the cost of the recession, provides the potential for a win-win agreement by 
the social partners. 
 
Crucially, the economy will have to gain competitiveness to incentivise 
new investment to replace the jobs lost in existing business in the tradable 
sector and to provide jobs for the prospective large increase in the number 
of unemployed. 
 
 While the seeds of a domestic crisis were sown in Ireland during the 
early years of this decade, their “maturing” need not have been quite as 
catastrophic as it has turned out were it not for simultaneous development 
of a very severe world recession. In that sense Ireland can consider itself a 
little unlucky.  
2.3  
World 
Financial and 
Economic 
Crisis  The depth of the current world recession is greater than that of any 
recession experienced in the world over the last 65 years. It is also more 
global in the sense that it is affecting all economies rather than being 
concentrated in particular regions of the world. The recent IMF World 
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Economic Outlook notes that 15 of 21 advanced economies are already in 
recession. For Ireland, the consequences are aggravated by this increased 
synchronisation of the world business cycle which is also reflected in the 
increased synchronisation of the Irish cycle with that of the Euro Area as a 
whole (Goggin and Siedschlag, 2009). This enhances the depth of the 
recession and also probably affects its duration. There is no region of the 
world where robust growth is continuing that could serve as an “engine” to 
restore growth to its neighbours. Given the extreme openness of the Irish 
economy any major world economic crisis would always be expected to 
have a major impact on domestic activity and living standards in Ireland.  
 
The world financial crisis has cruelly exposed defects in the banking 
system in many other countries. It has certainly ensured that all the 
problems with the Irish financial system would be exposed. It is hard to see 
a robust world recovery until the world financial system is put on a path to 
recovery. This highlights the importance of policy actions being taken by 
central banks and governments throughout the globe. 
 
 Ireland experienced a prolonged recession in the 1980s. While the fall in 
output in any single year was very limited, the cumulative 
underperformance of the economy over that decade was probably of a 
greater order of magnitude than is the case for today’s recession. 
Furthermore, the Irish economy at the start of the 1980s was operating at a 
very different level of activity than when the present recession began.  
Despite these differences, the 1980s recession holds some lessons for the 
current situation.  
2.4  
Lessons from 
the Past 
 
Despite a growing twin deficit problem, with both the balance of 
payments deficit and government borrowing growing rapidly in the early 
1980s, governments were initially slow to take action, greatly aggravating 
the depth and length of the recession. While the impending crisis was 
apparent in early 1980, effective fiscal action to cut the deficit was delayed 
until 1983. Then, over the three years 1983-5 taxation was raised and 
capital expenditure was cut introducing a very tight fiscal policy. However, 
it was not until 1987 that there was a turnaround in the public finances, 
mirrored in a stabilisation of the debt-GNP ratio, for which it was 
necessary to raise taxation further and to cut current expenditure. With the 
benefit of hindsight the cuts in capital expenditure were probably too 
drastic while the cuts in current expenditure should have taken place earlier 
in the 1980s. Possibly because of the length of the recession, public 
confidence in the robustness of the economy was very slow to return.  
 
Every recession is different and the appropriate medicine for the 1980s 
recession, prescribed with the benefit of hindsight, is not necessarily 
equally appropriate today. However, the experience of the 1980s does 
suggest that more rapid, though severe, action would have turned the 
economy around more rapidly and that an early restoration of public 
confidence could have truncated the length of the painful adjustment. This 
time round it suggests that rather than awaiting a recovery before tackling 
the public finance crisis, early action is desirable. This lesson has been 
learned with the government’s series of budgets for 2009 and their plans 
for the budget for 2010. 
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Among developed economies possibly the most notable example of a 
really deep recession is the experience of Finland and Sweden in the early 
1990s. In the case of Finland and Sweden financial liberalisation in the late 
1980s allowed the banking systems to expand rapidly their lending for 
investment in housing and property. As a result of this unregulated 
expansion a property market bubble developed across Scandinavia. The 
problems caused by the bursting of this bubble were greatly aggravated for 
Finland by the collapse of the Soviet Union – the main market for the 
exports from many Finnish firms. Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) 
described the Finnish crisis thus: 
 
In the 1990s, Finland underwent a deep recession as its GDP 
dropped about 14% and unemployment rose from 3 to almost 20%. This 
is a story of bad luck and bad policies. 
 
The crisis in Finland required a dramatic adjustment in the public 
finances but it also required a major reorientation of the economy away 
from building and construction and the production of goods for the Soviet 
market (Jonung, Kiander and Vartia, 2007). The Finnish economy had to 
reposition itself to develop export markets in the EU. To do this it had to 
improve its competitiveness very substantially. 
 
While Finland took reasonably prompt action to restore the public 
finances with a serious tightening of fiscal policy in 1991 and 1992, it was 
slow to act to achieve the necessary improvement in competitiveness. It 
delayed for two years before changing its exchange rate. Meanwhile 
domestic costs did not adjust downwards. It was only with a very 
substantial devaluation that the necessary improvement in competitiveness 
was achieved. As a result, unemployment rose towards 20 per cent of the 
labour force before falling back very gradually in the late 1990s. However, 
it never fell back to the level experienced in the years immediately prior to 
the crisis.  
 
For Ireland the Finnish experience suggests the benefit of prompt 
action to tackle any public finance crisis. Furthermore, it also suggests that 
prompt action to achieve the necessary improvement in competitiveness is 
important if the subsequent rise in unemployment is to be limited. In the 
case of Ireland this has to be achieved by a reduction in domestic price 
levels, including wage rates, given our fixed exchange rate relative to other 
Euro Area countries. Finally, it highlights the importance of developing 
adequate labour market policies to ensure that the essentially temporary rise 
in unemployment does not result in an increase in the numbers of long-
term unemployed over the course of the next decade. 
3. MEDIUM-TERM 
CHALLENGES 
In assessing the ‘cure’ for the economy it is important first to diagnose 
how much damage the ‘disease’ has caused. In this Section we first consider 
the potential growth rate of the Irish economy over the coming decade 
2011-2020 and how it has been damaged by the current recession. Second, 
we present an illustrative scenario on the possible effect that government 
funding of the banking sector could have on the national debt and debt 
interest payments over the next decade. Third, we discuss the issue of the 
financial sustainability of the Irish economy. We argue that the current 
recession, which has stimulated a large increase in savings on the part of 
the household and business sector, will ensure that Ireland avoids a twin-
deficit problem in future years as private sector net foreign indebtedness is 
likely to fall significantly over the medium term. This will ensure the 
financial sustainability of the economy vis-à-vis foreign debtors. 
3.1 
Introduction 
 
 In considering the likely growth path of the economy in the medium term 
a crucial issue is the potential growth rate of the economy over the relevant 
period. Potential output is itself a function of the endowment of physical 
and human capital in the economy. In turn, these vary over time driven by 
developments in the world economy. The measurement of the potential 
output of the economy is not straightforward and some of the commonly 
adopted approaches are described in Appendix 1. 
3.2  
Potential 
Output and 
the Structural 
Deficit 
 
The combination of the bursting of the property market bubble and the 
world financial crisis has had a substantial impact on the endowment of 
labour and capital in Ireland. This has served to permanently reduce the 
potential output of the economy. This reduction has been driven by four 
factors: 
• A significant part of the capital stock has been rendered obsolete 
through the closure of many businesses. While new investment will 
take place in the recovery phase, it will take much longer to put in 
place this new investment than it has taken to write off the 
investment due to the closure of existing businesses.  
• The dramatic increase in government indebtedness will result in a 
major increase in the burden of taxes, especially of taxes on labour. 
The deadweight effects of the increased tax burden will adversely 
affect the economy’s productive capacity.  
• The rise in the risk premium on borrowing has not only raised the 
cost of borrowing for the government but it has also affected the 
cost of capital for all borrowers. In turn, this means that the 
9 
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optimal level of the capital stock has been reduced and, with it, the 
potential output of the economy. 
• Finally, these factors are also affecting the wider world economy 
and, as discussed in Section 4 below, there has been a once-off 
reduction in the potential output of the world economy. 
 
The combined effect of these four factors is that while the Medium-Term 
Review 2008-2015 (MTR) published in Spring 2008 suggested that the 
potential output growth rate for the Irish economy over the period 2005-20 
was around 3.6 per cent a year, today we feel that it is closer to 3.0 per cent 
a year. The impact of this reduction in the rate of growth in potential 
output of the economy is illustrated in Figure 1. This shows the reduction 
in the expected output of the economy today compared to what was 
expected as little as a year ago. So for example, we estimate that by 2010, 
the depth of the current recession will imply that GDP will be almost 20 
per cent below the level estimated in the Spring 2008 MTR. This gap 
narrows over subsequent years as the bounce-back from such a deep 
recession involves higher annual growth rates in the recovery phase. 
Nevertheless, even ten years later, these estimates suggest that GDP will be 
10 per cent lower. The extreme nature of the recession being experienced, 
operating through the four mechanisms discussed above, may have resulted 
in a permanent loss of output relative to previous potential of around 10 
percentage points.   
Figure 1: Permanent Loss of Output Due to the Recession 
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The current estimate of the potential output of the Irish economy 
derived using the HERMES model is shown in Table 1 below for a series 
of five year periods, including the period to 2020. These estimates of the 
varying rate of growth of potential output reflect the changing endowment 
of physical and human capital. However, they also take account of the 
extent to which the utilisation of these factors would be consistent with the 
maintenance of balance in the economy – balance in the public finances; 
balance in the external payments of the economy; and balance in the labour 
market, reflected in a rate of wage inflation consistent with an 
unemployment rate of around 5 per cent. We favour this model-based 
approach to measuring the productive potential of the economy because it 
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takes account of the endogeneity of key prices in the economy and also of 
the fact that labour supply is unusually elastic in Ireland.  
Table 1: Rate of Growth in Potential Output 
      
1990-95 1995-00 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 
4.0 7.2 5.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
      
 
Obviously when using the model in the out of sample period a degree 
of judgement is required. In estimating potential output to 2020, we use the 
World Recovery scenario described later in this paper (see Section 4.4 for 
details). This scenario meets the requirement that it reflects a sustainable 
growth path for the Irish economy in terms of the balances identified 
above, while also ensuring appropriate utilisation rates of capital and labour 
in the medium term. 
 
On the basis of these rates of growth in potential output and of the 
actual growth in output in the past (and the output levels shown below in 
the World Recovery scenario to 2020) we show the ratio of actual to potential 
output between 1970 and 2020 in Figure 2. Where the ratio is over one it 
implies that the economy was operating above its potential output. While, 
as shown in the Figure, this could persist for some time, the consequences 
of such above capacity output generally sets in train a series of events 
which makes this trajectory unsustainable. For example, in the period to 
2007 there was a much higher rate of inflation in Ireland (including wage 
inflation) than in its key trading partners and the balance of payments 
showed a rapid deterioration after 2003.  
 
Sustained under-performance where output is below potential is also 
possible, as evident in Figure 2, when in the case of the 1980s it is also 
reflected in domestic imbalances. In that case the dramatic rise in 
unemployment and its persistence into the late 1990s at a high level was 
symptomatic of an economy operating below capacity. 
Figure 2: The Output Gap. Actual/Potential Output 1970-2020 
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In Figure 2 potential output has been benchmarked by being set equal 
to actual output in 1999, a year when the labour market was close to full 
employment and there was no evidence of significant wage inflation. Also 
the current account of the balance of payments was close to balance in that 
year. On this basis, Figure 2 shows actual output was above potential for 
most of the period from 2000 to 2007. Over that period the labour market 
remained very tight and the rate of wage inflation rose over time. The 
internal imbalances in the economy were also reflected in a rising balance 
of payments deficit from 2003 onwards. By 2007, when the housing bubble 
reached its maximum, actual output was nearly 10 percentage points above 
the long-term potential of the economy. 
 
With the dramatic reduction in output in 2008-2010 actual output is 
expected to fall to over 10 per cent below potential in 2010. As the world 
economic recovery begins, the ratio will begin to climb back so that by 
2015 the level of actual output will be back close to its long-term potential. 
With the economy assumed to grow at potential from 2015 onwards 
(around 3 per cent) the index would remain close to unity. As can be seen 
from the shaded areas in Figure 2, while the amplitude of the loss of output 
relative to potential in this recession may prove to be similar to that of the 
1980s, the cumulative loss of output sustained in the 1980s was very large 
compared to the expected loss of output from the current crisis. This 
illustrates the potential advantage to the economy of taking prompt policy 
action to address the current crisis. If appropriate policy action is taken the 
loss of output compared to the previous recession can be greatly reduced.  
 
If the world recession had not occurred and if, as a result, the potential 
growth rate of the economy for the period 2005-20 had been 3.6 per cent a 
year as suggested in the last Medium-Term Review, then the output gap would 
have been slightly smaller in 2007. However, it would still have been very 
substantial reflecting the fact that the economy was in an unsustainable 
position at that point in time. 
 
In Appendix 1 we show an alternative method for deriving an estimate 
of potential output which uses a less sophisticated methodology than the 
model-based approach used here. It arrives at roughly the same conclusion 
as to the extent of the output gap today. 
 
In summary, the current financial crisis and the resulting economic 
recession has taken a heavy toll on the Irish economy. It is not just that 
there has been a collapse in output but the nature of the recession and the 
change in the cost of capital may have longer-term consequences. It is 
likely that there has been some reduction in the potential growth rate of 
both the world economy and the Irish economy. As a result, even when 
there is a recovery it is likely that the level of output will not bounce back 
to where it would otherwise have been – in other words there will be a 
permanent loss of output. However, as with most recessions, the rate of 
growth in the recovery phase will rise above the potential output growth 
rate of the world economy, recovering some of the loss ground. 
 
What this analysis implies is that once the world recovery has picked up 
momentum it will begin to impact positively on Ireland. Current 
international forecasts suggest that this could happen in 2011. As discussed 
below in Section 4, in this recovery phase growth rates of 5 to 6 per cent in 
Ireland would be likely. A similar pattern of above average growth rates in 
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the recovery phase can be expected in the US, the EU and the rest of the 
world economy. However, this would not be a return to the heady days of 
the 1990s and the recovery would reflect a restoration of only some of the 
major losses sustained over the period 2008-10. It would still leave the 
long-term loss of output as a result of the recession at over 10 per cent. 
 
This rapid growth in the recovery period will reflect the fact that in the 
very many businesses that survive the recession, there will be very 
considerable spare capacity. Without any further investment they will be 
able to ramp up output in the recovery phase once world demand begins to 
rise. 
 
The very large gap between actual and potential output that has 
emerged since 2008 has led to a very rapid deterioration in the public 
finances. This has occurred through the operation of the automatic 
stabilisers, where lower economic activity and employment lead to lower 
tax revenues and higher cyclical expenditure. However, the scale of the 
deficit which emerged in 2008, at 7.1 per cent of GDP, and the extremely 
rapid deterioration in the tax share in the Irish economy revealed the depth 
of the structural problems facing the fiscal authorities. The serious policy 
mistake at the turn of the decade was effectively to use the windfall inflows 
of property-related taxes to substitute for other sources of taxation, rather 
than to set those funds aside for a “rainy day”. These windfall gains were in 
turn used to fund expenditure, so that the collapse in the housing market 
has left the authorities with a very large “structural deficit”. 
 
The structural deficit is the deficit that will remain when the economy 
recovers so that the actual level of output is roughly equal to the capacity 
level of output. The rest of the deficit today, the cyclical component, is 
then due to the fact that the economy is currently operating well below its 
long-run potential. The world recovery and the related recovery in the Irish 
economy can be expected to eliminate this cyclical component of the 
deficit but the structural element will persist unless and until the 
government takes action to raise taxes or to cut expenditure. In this paper 
we use the HERMES model to estimate the current magnitude of the 
structural deficit.4  
 
As shown in Figure 3 the share of tax revenue in GNP in 2008 fell by 
almost 4 percentage points relative to 2006. This was largely driven by the 
dramatic fall in property related taxes in 2007 and 2008, which in turn was 
driven by the growing dependence of the government’s finances on such 
taxes since 2000. The rapid increase in the share of expenditure in GDP in 
2008 reflects the fall in nominal GDP as well as an increase in debt interest 
payments and in welfare payments, the latter being mainly due to the rise in 
unemployment.  
 
 
 
 
 
4 As shown below in the World Recovery scenario in Chapter 4 actual output in the Irish 
economy should be roughly equal to potential output by 2015. Hence, with the cyclical 
component of the deficit eliminated in that year, the remaining deficit in 2015 is defined as 
being “structural”. 
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Figure 3: Tax Revenue and Total Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 
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The emergence of a substantial structural deficit in recent years was 
masked by the effects of the property bubble boosting temporarily the 
property related taxes. Once the full magnitude of this structural deficit was 
exposed at the end of 2008, it left the authorities with no option but to 
tighten fiscal policy despite the depth of the recession.5  
 
The appropriate target for fiscal policy is the structural deficit, namely 
the deficit that is due to structural imbalances in the economy. The 
structural deficit is relatively invariant to short term fluctuations in the 
outside world and is, thus, a more certain target for fiscal policy. The rest 
of the deficit, the cyclical element, should not be targeted by public policy; 
it will disappear as the world economy recovers pulling the Irish economy 
with it.  
 
Before the budget on 7 April 2009, our estimate was that the general 
government deficit in 2009 was likely to substantially exceed 10 per cent of 
GDP, and could have reached as high as 15 per cent. This represented a 
substantial deterioration in the prospective deficit for 2009 since the 
beginning of the year. Much of this deterioration was due to the dramatic 
downward revision in the prospective growth rates for the major world 
economies. Forecasts for economic growth in our key neighbours remain 
highly uncertain. This makes the targeting of a specific borrowing figure 
for 2009 exceptionally difficult.   
 
Our research suggests that roughly half of this deficit was structural. We 
estimate that the structural deficit for 2009 before the April Supplementary 
Budget was of the order of 6 per cent to 8 per cent of GDP. As indicated 
above this estimate is based on the estimated size of the actual deficit once 
the economy has returned to its potential growth rate, in other  words once 
 
5 The scale of structural deficit exposes the difficult choice facing the authorities. Were 
there no structural deficit, then the most appropriate action for the authorities would be to 
allow the cyclical deficit to increase through the automatic stabilisers, in other words, take 
no discretionary fiscal action. Indeed, when economies face very deep recessions, such as 
that which Ireland currently faces, it is often argued that fiscal policy should be used to 
stimulate economic activity.  
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all cyclical effects have been removed. In relation to our World Recovery 
scenario in this document, this occurs around 2015, when the labour 
market is close to equilibrium and a number of years of rapid growth will 
have closed the gap between actual and potential output (see Figure 2 
above).  
 
 At this stage it is not possible to quantify in any formal way the likely 
long-run impact on the economy of the government actions needed to 
achieve a resolution of the current crisis in the banking sector. Here we 
provide an illustrative set of numbers which allow us to tease out the 
mechanisms through which this resolution will affect the government 
accounts and the wider economy. Because of the tentative nature of this 
analysis we have not attempted to incorporate these numbers into the 
macro-economic scenarios shown below. 
3.3  
The Banking 
System and 
the National 
Debt 
 
There are currently three key elements to the government’s approach to 
the resolution of this crisis.  
 
First, the government guarantee for two years of the bank’s liabilities, 
which was given at the end of September 2008. This guarantee, and the 
uncertainty it caused about the government’s finances, has resulted in a 
very substantial risk premium being charged on Irish government 
borrowing.  
 
The second element is the decision to set up the National Asset 
Management Agency (NAMA) which will purchase the property loans 
from the banks (probably by exchanging the assets for government bonds) 
at what is likely to be a steep discount on the book value of the loans.  It is 
important that this discount adequately reflects the likely eventual 
reduction in the value of these loans. The loans will thereafter be managed 
by, or on behalf of, NAMA.  
 
The third element is the recapitalisation of the banks. The bigger the 
discount offered for taking the property loans the bigger the write-down 
required in the bank’s capital and accordingly the higher will be the 
necessary investment of risk capital into the banks to restore their capital to 
regulatory adequacy. While private investors might conceivably be willing 
to make some of that injection, in current international market conditions 
it is likely that the government will be the only willing investor.  At the very 
least it will probably acquire a large equity stake or possibly even full 
ownership. 
 
There is a range of different ways that the banking crisis could impact 
on the government’s finances resulting in a permanent loss of output in the 
economy.  
 
The first, and probably the most important, is the potential long-term 
impact of the banking crisis on the availability of finance for the company 
and the household sectors. This is already having a substantial impact on 
current activity and, unless resolved, a credit shortage could delay or even 
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prevent an economic recovery from 2011 onwards.6 It is for this reason 
that the government needs to take urgent action to resolve this aspect of 
the crisis. If successful, the government action should see finance 
becoming available to underpin any recovery from 2011 onwards. 
Table 2: Assumed Irish Risk Premium Relative to Germany on 
Government Borrowing, Percentage Points 
         
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
0.0 0.5 3 2 1.5 1.25 1 1 0.75 
         
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics for 2007 and 2008. Authors’ assumptions for 
2009-2015. 
 
The second way that the government finances are impacted by the 
banking crisis is the risk premium charged on all government borrowing 
because of the uncertainty about the government’s contingent liabilities 
(due to the bank guarantee). For illustrative purposes we assume a profile 
for this risk premium as shown in Table 2. It is assumed that the risk 
margin begins to fall in 2010 as the crisis begins to abate. On the 
assumption that the economy shows a rapid recovery from 2011 onwards 
the margin is assumed to fall in 2011 and 2012, though still remaining 
above pre-crisis levels out to at least 2015.  
 
If the property loans are taken from the banks at a price that is equal to 
their underlying market value, there should be no long-term cost to the 
taxpayer from this transaction. Of course, it will be difficult to choose an 
appropriate valuation in the absence of a market for these assets. However, 
even if the appropriate valuation could be determined, it would have a 
major effect on the public finances for quite a number of years. For 
illustrative purposes we assume that the value of the property portfolio 
transferred to NAMA will amount to between €80 billion and €90 billion. 
The appropriate price to be paid for this portfolio is yet to be determined. 
For illustrative purposes we use here a figure of €50 billion, the illustrative 
number used in the NTMA press release of 8 April, 2009. 
 
In return for the assets sold to NAMA the banks will receive 
government bonds. The counterpart to these bonds will be a liability by 
NAMA to the government equal to the value of the bonds so issued. The 
interest on these bonds will be a continuing charge on the public finances 
with the interest being paid to the banks (the holders of the bonds). In 
return, NAMA will be liable to pay an equivalent amount of interest to the 
government until the loan and property portfolio of NAMA is liquidated. 
At the point that the portfolio is liquidated the government will redeem the 
equivalent amount of government bonds with the proceeds from the 
winding up of NAMA. 
 
On the simplifying assumption that NAMA will have no current 
income, it will continue to roll up its interest liabilities to the government 
until its entire portfolio is liquidated. This is an extreme assumption as 
many of the loans will continue to be remunerated by the beneficiaries. 
However, it simplifies the exposition for the purpose of this analysis. 
 
6 Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, “Irish Responses to the Euro 
Area Bank Lending Survey”, April 2009. 
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If NAMA is to realise the full value of this portfolio it will be many 
years before all of the loans are repaid or the assets are sold off. For 
illustrative purposes we here assume that the entire portfolio is 
simultaneously liquidated in 2020. At that point we assume that NAMA 
would repay all of its loans from the government, including the 
accumulated interest liability. In turn, the government would then pay back 
an equivalent amount of government bonds, reducing the national debt. 
 
The third element of the government package will involve the 
recapitalisation of the banks. The amount of capital required will be 
increased as a result of the severe write down of the banks’ property 
portfolio to reflect its long-term value. For illustrative purposes we assume 
that the amount of the recapitalisation will be around 12 per cent of GDP 
or around €20 billion (including the capital already injected).7 This money 
will have to be borrowed by the government through issuing more bonds. 
In turn the interest on these bonds will add to government borrowing.  
Once again we assume that this interest is rolled up till the banks are 
eventually sold off. 
 
To simplify the exposition we assume here that no dividend is paid by 
the banks to the government until the government sells off its shares in the 
recapitalised banks. In turn, for illustrative purposes, we assume that this all 
takes place in 2015 and that the price received equals the amount of the 
capital injected by the government together with the accumulated interest 
on the bonds issued to raise that capital. However, it is quite possible that 
some of the cost of the write down in the value of the assets will affect the 
value of the banks such that the government may not realise the full cost of 
its investment. 
 
On this set of assumptions, which is used strictly for the purposes of 
illustration, there would be three ways that the Irish State could make a loss 
from the banking crisis. These are of course additional to the loss that has 
already been incurred as a result of the very substantial damage done to the 
wider economy by the banking crisis. It is difficult to separate this cost 
from the wider costs of the bursting of the property bubble and the world 
recession. Nonetheless, as shown in this paper, the costs are likely to be 
very large as a result of a permanent reduction in the output capacity of the 
Irish economy.  
• First, there is the cost of the risk premium attaching to Irish 
government borrowing as a result of the banking crisis. On the 
basis of the moderate risk premium shown in Table 2, the 
cumulative cost of the higher interest payments as a result of the 
risk premium would reach a total of 8 per cent of GDP by 2015.  
• The second potential way the State could lose would be through 
overpaying for the property portfolio of the banks. Here it is 
assumed that the State gets the price right and that it eventually 
realises the full value of its investment in NAMA so that there is no 
loss.  
 
7 The IMF recently suggested a figure of €24 billion. However, we have rounded it down 
to take account of the fact that once the property loans are bought by NAMA the 
government bonds in the banks’ restructured portfolios of assets will be very low risk 
assets, with consequential implications for the banks’ capital needs. 
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• The third way the State could lose would be through a failure by 
the State to realise the full value of its capital injection into the 
banking system at the point where the State’s shareholding is sold 
off. In Table 3 it is assumed that the State recovers the exact 
amount of its initial investment, including the accumulated interest 
cost of financing the government’s injection of capital. However, as 
noted above, because of the losses of the banks, the government 
may not realise the full value of its investment. 
It is also possible that the State could make a profit either from 
NAMA’s management of the property loan portfolio or from the 
recapitalisation of the banking system. Honohan,8 has argued that NAMA 
should buy the property loan portfolio at a price that leaves some scope for 
such a profit. Such an approach would reduce the danger of mispricing in a 
market where accurate values are difficult to determine. Depending on the 
terms of the property acquisition by NAMA, any resulting profit would 
either accrue wholly to the government or some of it could be shared with 
the shareholders in the banks. 
Table 3: National Debt, Percentage of GDP 
              
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Normal Debt 41 57 70 77 80 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 81 
NAMA  30 31 31 30 29 28 28 27 27 27 27 0 
Recapital-
isation  12 13 13 12 12 12 11 0 0 0 0 0 
Gross debt: 41 99 114 121 123 123 122 121 110 110 109 108 81 
NPRF 11 12 13 12 12 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Liquid assets 10 11 11 11 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NET debt 20 76 90 98 106 107 111 110 99 100 100 99 72 
             
 
Table 3 shows the effects of these illustrative assumptions on the 
national debt over the period to 2020. The “normal debt” is the result of 
borrowing by the government sector to fund the general government 
deficit, as set out in Chapter 4 of this paper in the World Recovery scenario.  
In addition to the “normal” debt, the funding needed for NAMA and the 
recapitalisation of the banking system is added to give the gross debt. The 
figures for NAMA include an estimate of the interest on their debts which 
is assumed to be rolled up until the assets are all sold off and NAMA is 
closed. As a result, it is assumed that when the debts are repaid to the State 
the repayment will include the accumulated interest liabilities of the 
relevant entities. In this illustrative model, when these deductions are taken 
into account the gross debt to GDP ratio is assumed to peak at 123 per 
cent of GDP in 2012 before falling back to 72 per cent in 2020. 
 
To arrive at the net debt of the government sector, the true measure of 
the State’s exposure, a number of items are deducted. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that there is no further investment in the National Pensions 
Reserve Fund (NPRF). The NPRF is assumed to achieve a rate of return 
equal to the German government bond rate of interest over the period 
2010-20. The liquid assets held by the government are assumed to be 
 
8http://www.thepost.ie/post/pages/p/story.aspx-qqqt=NEWS+FEATURES-
qqqm=nav-qqqid=41001-qqqx=1.asp 
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phased out as the government’s borrowing needs are brought under 
control. (Under these circumstances the concerns about liquidity which 
currently underlie the need for such holdings will disappear.)  Taking these 
factors into account the net debt to GDP ratio would peak at 111 per cent 
of GDP in 2014 before falling back to 72 per cent of GDP in 2020. 
 
In addition to the effect of the funding of NAMA and the bank 
recapitalisation on the national debt, there will also be a significant impact 
on national debt interest payments. In Table 3 it is assumed that the bank 
recapitalisation and NAMA will only pay their share of the interest 
payments when they are liquidated – assumed to be 2015 and 2020 
respectively. In this case the government interest payments would not be 
offset by any current receipt and the government borrowing requirement 
will be increased by the amount of the additional interest payments. This 
effect is shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: Additional National Debt Interest Payments, Percentage of GDP   
          
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 
          
 
Of course it will be open to the government to require the banks to pay 
dividends once they return to profitability. These dividends would offset 
some of the interest cost from 2012 or 2013 onwards. In addition the 
government has suggested that it will require the banks to pay around €1.5 
billion (0.9 per cent of GDP) a year for the government guarantee and 
recapitalisation beginning in 2009. However, it is not clear whether this will 
go ahead in the face of the recapitalisation and the establishment of 
NAMA.  
 
Over the period 1995-2003, before the property bubble got out of hand, 
the operating surplus of the banking sector in Ireland averaged something 
over 4 per cent of GDP a year. On the basis of the market share of Irish 
banks this would translate into an operating surplus for them of around 2.5 
per cent a year. In addition to this sum must be added the operating 
surplus of the Irish-owned banks from their overseas operations.  
 
The effect of the current economic crisis will be to reduce dramatically 
the operating surplus of the banks, both Irish and foreign. This loss of 
profitability will likely persist until after the economy recovers. However, if 
the economy were to recover from 2011 onwards the profitability of the 
restored banking system would be likely to recover over the period 2012 to 
2015. In turn, its operating surplus (effectively profits before deductions 
for losses, valuation changes, taxes etc.) will then begin to recover towards 
its pre crisis levels.  
 
If the result of the recapitalisation of the banking system by the 
government was that it acquired at least a majority shareholding in the 
main Irish banks, then a significant share of this operating surplus would 
accrue to the government. While it might be prudent to retain most of 
these profits in the banks in the early stages of any recovery, they would 
serve to enhance the likely resale value of the banks when they are sold off, 
while also allowing the possibility of some dividend income for the 
government in the period before such a sale takes place. While the 
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accumulated losses of the banking system could see the government failing 
to realise the full value of its investment in the banking system, with a 
return to growth along the lines set out in this paper, a profitable banking 
sector would hold out the prospect of the government being able to sell off 
its shares at a profit for the taxpayer in the period 2015 to 2020. 
 
One danger is that the banks under State control might not be 
permitted to return to their “normal” profitability levels once the economy 
recovers. Currently, the banks are earning an unusually low margin on their 
lending because of high interest rates on their borrowings and depressed 
interest rates on their loan portfolio. If interest rates did not rise in the 
recovery period to restore normal margins the tax payer could be faced 
with a substantial continuing loss that might never be recouped and the 
eventual disposal of the banks could be much delayed. 
 
In the case of NAMA it is quite possible that it will pay some dividend 
to the government from its inception, reflecting the fact that some of the 
borrowers from NAMA will be paying significant interest payments. This 
could also reduce the impact on the borrowing requirement of the 
recapitalisation of the banking system.  
 
 In considering the financial sustainability of the Irish economy, and of the 
public finances in particular, there are a number of important 
considerations. First, the government sector began 2009 with a very low 
debt/GDP ratio. When allowance is made for financial assets held at the 
NTMA, it amounted to only 20 per cent of GDP, an exceptionally low 
level by international standards. Second, under the World Recovery scenario 
set out in Section 4.4 the current account of the balance of payments is 
likely to move into surplus and remain in surplus over the period to 2015. 
The counterpart to the surplus on the current account will be an outflow 
on the capital account as Ireland reduces its net foreign liabilities over that 
period. While government foreign liabilities will rise, the net liabilities of 
the private sector, including the banking system, will fall by even more. 
3.4  
Financial 
Sustainability 
and the 
Balance of 
Payments  
 
Under monetary union private debts by Irish citizens or companies were 
not considered as having major national implications. If an Irish citizen or 
company were to have difficulty repaying its foreign debts, that difficulty 
was considered to be a problem for the private sector creditors and private 
sector debtors so affected. However, the deterioration in the current 
account (Figure 4) masked a major change affecting the banking system. 
While the government’s accounts were broadly in balance up to 2007, the 
massive expansion in activity in the building and construction sector, 
especially in housing, ran well ahead of personal sector savings. As a result 
the household sector had very extensive recourse to the banking sector to 
finance its investment boom.   
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Figure 4: Balance of Payments and Government Borrowing, Percentage 
of GDP 
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In turn the banking sector financed this boom by borrowing extensively 
abroad. Figure 5 shows the net foreign liabilities of the banking system 
over the last three decades. While under normal circumstances this increase 
in net foreign liabilities was easily fundable, since September 2008 it proved 
very difficult to do so in a normal manner because of the dislocation in the 
world financial system. While the ECB stepped in to provide liquidity, the 
deep-rooted problems in the banking system, specifically the problems in 
Anglo-Irish Bank, forced major government intervention. As a result the 
liabilities of the Irish banking system have become the contingent liabilities 
of the government (largely counterbalanced by the associated banking 
sector assets). 
Figure 5: Net Foreign Liabilities of Banking System, Percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ESRI Databank. 
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There is a major difference between the current situation in Ireland and 
that of Ireland in the early 1980s (or Spain, Greece or Estonia today). As 
shown in Figure 4, whereas the government borrowing requirement may be 
around 12 per cent of GDP in 2009, the balance of payments deficit is 
forecast to disappear in 2010. This contrasts with the crisis in the early 
1980s when both were over 10 per cent, which meant that Ireland as a 
whole was increasing its net foreign liabilities at a rapid rate in a manner 
which was clearly unsustainable in the long run.  
 
The government deficit in 2009 will be substantially funded by 
borrowing abroad while the household and the company sectors are 
accumulating a very large surplus of funds which they are using to reduce 
their borrowing.9  In the medium term it seems likely that the bulk of this 
reduction in the net financial liability of the private sector will be reflected 
in increased deposits and reduced lending by the domestic banking system. 
Signs of this turnaround can be seen in Figure 5 for 2008 where the 
banking system’s net foreign liabilities fell very significantly over the course 
of the year. 
 
Given that fiscal policy has delivered a significant reduction in the 
government’s structural deficit in 2009 and if the further reduction planned 
for 2010 is implemented, that will contribute to the major improvement in 
the current account.10 This means that the external borrowing by the 
government sector of almost 12 per cent of GDP will be counterbalanced 
by a substantial reduction in the banking sector’s net foreign liabilities. 
With the liabilities of the Irish banking sector being guaranteed by the Irish 
government, this will mean that the government’s contingent liabilities will 
remain roughly unchanged in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Looking beyond 2010, any recovery in the Irish economy is likely to 
occur through a recovery in world demand that increases the demand for 
Irish exports. Consequently, as shown later in Section 4.4, the next few 
years are likely to see a continuing significant surplus on the balance of 
payments counterbalanced by a gradual fall in government borrowing. This 
is likely to mean a continuing reduction in the net foreign liabilities of the 
banking system. 
 
The Irish economy is today operating within a global financial system. 
The bulk of the funding for the government is likely to come from abroad 
while the bulk of the debt repayment by the banking system will be to its 
external creditors. Viewed in this light, the prospect of a surplus on the 
current account balance means that the current fiscal crisis, while obviously 
undesirable because of the loss of productive capital that it involves and 
the prospect of future distortions that it holds out, is sustainable. 
 
When one compares the position of the Irish economy, with its balance 
of payments current account heading towards balance, with that of other 
countries with substantial continuing deficits, the risk premium currently 
exacted on lending to the Irish government relative to those countries 
seems surprising. With the burden of the government’s contingent 
 
9  See Box on pages 27-29 of the ESRI’s Winter 2008 Quarterly Economic Commentary. 
10 Generally every 1 percentage point reduction in the structural deficit is accompanied by 
a 1 percentage point improvement in the current account of the balance of payments. 
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liabilities unchanging or even falling, the overall financial sustainability of 
the government sector and of the economy as a whole should not be in 
doubt. With effective fiscal action to tackle the deficit in the budget for 
2010, a gradual fall in the current risk premium could be anticipated from 
2011 onwards. 
 
4. PATHS TO RECOVERY 
This section explores two growth scenarios for the Irish economy over 
the period 2009-2015.  We refer to these as the World Recovery Scenario and 
the Prolonged Recession Scenario. We begin by outlining the assumptions 
underlying these two scenarios. These assumptions concern the timing and 
strength of the world economy and the fiscal policy pursued by the 
government over the next eighteen months. It then develops these 
scenarios for the Irish economy concentrating on the period to 2015. The 
additional risks facing the economy in the medium term and the 
implications of our results for policy are discussed at the end of this 
section. 
4.1 
Introduction 
 
Two scenarios for the Irish economy are examined for the period 2009-
2015. The objective of these scenarios is to assess the extent to which the 
current public finance problems are structural and how an economic 
recovery will affect the future path of unemployment. Using two different 
assumptions about the world recovery these scenarios model the resultant 
time path of the economy and of the public finances out to 2015.  
 
These scenarios have been developed using the HERMES macro-
economic model of the Irish economy. (Details of the behaviour of this 
model are set out in a separate ESRI Working Paper by Bergin, Conefrey, 
Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 2009.) They are roughly calibrated to the Quarterly 
Economic Commentary numbers for 2009 and 2010, published in April 2009. 
 
The World Recovery Scenario presented in this paper shows how the Irish 
economy would develop on the basis of the Budgets implemented for 2009 
and the planned Budget for 2010, as recently outlined by the government 
in the Supplementary Budget. Beyond 2010 we assume a neutral fiscal 
policy.11  
 
The Prolonged Recession Scenario assumes that the world economy recovers 
from recession one year later; in other words, growth is assumed to return 
to the world economy in 2012 rather than 2011. 
 
Throughout the scenarios it is assumed that the financial system is 
reformed and restructured so that it responds to the recovery in the 
economy in 2011/12 by providing adequate credit. However, no account is 
taken in the analysis presented of the need to finance this restructuring of 
the banks because of the large degree of uncertainty with regard to these 
numbers. This issue was addressed in Section 3.3 earlier in this paper and is 
discussed further in Section 4.7 below. 
 
 
11 This means that beyond 2010 our fiscal policy assumptions deviate from those 
envisaged in the Macro-Economic and Fiscal Framework: 2009-13, where continued policy 
adjustments to reduce the deficit are envisaged in each of the subsequent years to 2013. 
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 Both world demand and Ireland’s relative cost competitiveness drive the 
output of the tradable sector in the domestic economy. Our estimates 
suggest that a fall in world output of 1 per cent in the long run reduces the 
demand for Irish output by around 1.1 per cent (Bergin, Conefrey, Fitz 
Gerald and Kearney, 2009). Bergin and Kearney (2007) suggest that the 
responsiveness to world activity could even be higher than this. Whichever 
estimate is used, it is clear that Irish output is very sensitive to any global 
downturn.  
4.2  
World 
Economy 
 
The share of world production that is located in Ireland depends on the 
investment decisions by individual firms. In the case of the high technology 
sector, the bulk of new investment comes from foreign firms and takes the 
form of foreign direct investment (FDI). One of the risks associated with 
the current recession is that firms may decide to pull out of Ireland.  If they 
pull out, they will not come back when the upturn occurs whereas a 
temporary reduction in output (downsizing) could be reversed more easily.  
In terms of competitiveness, any gain in Ireland’s relative position increases 
Ireland’s global market share and leads to faster growth than in the world 
economy, while any loss in competitiveness reverses this process. Finally, 
Euroframe (Spring Report 2007) highlight the importance of the financial 
and monetary policy channels in the transmission of shocks across 
countries.  
 
In considering how the Irish economy is likely to exit from the current 
recession the key lies with the timing and nature of a world recovery. In the 
scenarios which we develop later in this paper we explore two different 
examples of a world recovery. In the World Recovery scenario the forecasts 
for the world economy for 2009-2010 are taken from the OECD Economic 
Outlook Interim Report (March 2009) and the medium term forecasts to 2015 
come from the National Institute Economic Review of January 2009. In essence, 
they anticipate a sharp contraction in activity in the major economic blocks 
in 2009 that impacts immediately on the Irish economy. A tentative 
recovery is expected in 2010 with growth expected to be very modest or 
flat that year. Most of the world’s economies are forecast to grow at rates 
close to potential over the period 2011-2015. Table 5 summarises the 
growth prospects for the international economy over the medium term. 
Table 5: Real GDP Growth, World Recovery  
      
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-2015 
USA 2.0 1.3 -4.0 0.0 3.0 
UK 3.0 0.7 -3.7 -0.2 2.6 
Euro Area 2.6 0.9 -4.1 -0.3 2.1 
World 5.0 3.5 -4.3 -0.1 4.2 
      
Source: NIESR, OECD. 
 
Although the medium-term growth rates may appear optimistic, we 
have actually adopted a rather conservative strategy in relation to the long-
term damage to the world economy (assuming that it is quite large). The 
fall in output in 2009 in the OECD forecast is much greater than that 
assumed in the NIESR forecast, on which our medium-term growth 
assumptions are based. It is possible that the more severe downturn could 
be mirrored by a more vigorous recovery which would produce more 
favourable results for the Irish economy than we are assuming here. Our 
assumptions are also significantly more pessimistic than the “benign 
 
26 RECOVERY SCENARIOS FOR IRELAND 
scenario” in the latest IMF World Economic Outlook. If we used the IMF 
scenario instead of the one shown in Table 5, the recovery in Ireland would 
be significantly stronger than shown in this paper and the permanent loss 
of output would be slightly less than shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 6 shows what these forecasts imply for the permanent effect on 
the level of output arising from the financial crisis. The graph shows that 
on the basis of these forecasts output in the Euro Area, the US, the UK 
and the OECD would be permanently between 6 and 10 per cent below 
where it otherwise would have been without the current crisis.  
Figure 6: Scarring from the Financial Crisis: Effect on the Level of GDP 
Compared to the MTR 2008 Benchmark 
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Source: OECD, NIESR. 
 
This permanent loss of output will arise from the same set of factors 
that are expected to give rise to a permanent loss of output in Ireland 
(Section 3.2). This set of forecasts is predicated on the assumption that 
problems in the international banking sector will be resolved quickly. 
However, because of uncertainty about how rapidly these problems will be 
dealt with it is important to examine the implications for the domestic 
economy of a delay in the recovery of the international economy. In 
Section 4.5, we examine the effect of pushing back the recovery in the 
international economy by one year so that it begins in 2011 instead of 2010. 
Figure 7 shows the effect on the level of GDP (not the growth rate) for 
the UK, the US and the OECD of pushing back the recovery by a year – it 
reduces the level of GDP by around 2.5 per cent below where it otherwise 
would have been over the medium term. This Prolonged Recession scenario, is 
in turn, less pessimistic than the IMF’s “downside scenario” which assumes 
that world governments do not take the appropriate action to promote an 
economic recovery.  
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Figure 7: The Impact on the Level of GDP of the Prolonged Recession 
Scenario Compared with the World Recovery Scenario 
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A delayed recovery along the lines we have assumed would be quite 
severe, not just for Ireland but for the rest of the world. When the loss of 
output implied by Figure 6 for the World Recovery scenario is added to that 
in Figure 7 the permanent loss of output for the US, the UK and the Euro 
Area would amount to over 10 per cent of GDP. This is the international 
background to the Prolonged Recession scenario considered below for the 
Irish economy. 
 
 The scenarios shown in the next two sections incorporate the decisions 
made based on the January 2009 Addendum to the Irish Stability Programme 
Update and the April 7th 2009 Supplementary Budget. In preparing these 
scenarios, it is also assumed that the broad measures for the 2010 budget 
outlined in the supplementary budget will be implemented as planned in 
terms of the reduction in the structural deficit. The fiscal policy 
assumptions underlying the different scenarios are summarised in Table 6. 
The first column shows the effects within the calendar year 2009 of fiscal 
policy measures taken in 2009. The second column shows the full year 
effects of these measures. The third column shows the effects within 2010 
of measures to be taken in the 2010 budget and the fourth column shows 
the full year effects of those measures. 
4.3  
Irish Public 
Finances  
 
The January package of €1.8 billion primarily affected current 
expenditure through reducing payroll costs via the pension levy and it was 
equivalent to €2 billion in a full year. In the April 7th Supplementary 
Budget, additional cuts in current expenditure of €886 million were also 
announced, again mainly falling on payroll costs. In addition to these cuts 
on the current expenditure side, the April measures also included cuts of 
€576 million on capital expenditure. On the taxation side, we have 
implemented the announced tax increases in the April supplementary 
budget, which mainly fall on income tax (via the income levy) and the 
health levy. Together these amount to increases of €1.8 billion, rising to 
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€3.55 billion on a full year basis. These cuts are equivalent to €1.2 billion 
on a full year basis. On a full year basis, and including the expenditure cuts 
introduced in February, these measures together are equivalent to over 4 
per cent of GDP. 
 
For 2010 we also fully implemented the broad measures announced in 
the Supplementary Budget. To operationalise the increase in taxes of €1.75 
billion announced, we spread these increases across income taxes (€850 
million), excise taxes (€100 million), a carbon tax and other taxes. This 
package is purely illustrative. On the expenditure side, gross current 
expenditure is cut by €1.5 billion while gross capital expenditure is cut by 
€750 million. On a full year basis the 2010 measures are equivalent to 
almost 3 per cent of GDP.  
 
If fully implemented, the cumulative impact of these measures would be 
such that the government will have ex ante reduced borrowing by over 7 
per cent of GDP in 2010. The scale of this correction is very large, 
unprecedented in Irish fiscal history. In terms of the composition of the 
announced cuts, they are spread equally between revenue and expenditure, 
with the emphasis being placed on ‘price’ savings that can be made on the 
expenditure side. Official budget figures suggest that volume of 
government consumption of goods and services should remain unchanged 
in 2010, implying further cuts in wages and prices paid for goods and 
services in the public sector that year. 
Table 6: Fiscal Policy Assumptions 
 
 
 2009 Supplementary 
Budgets 
2010 Budget 
  
Effects in 
2009 Full Year 
Effects in 
2010 Full Year 
Tax revenue  
(incl PRSI and health 
levy) 1,799 3,550 1,750 2,500 
     
Current expenditure 
 (gross) -2,686 -3,200 -1,500 -1,500 
     
Capital expenditure 
 (gross) -576 -576 -750 -750 
     
Total ex ante cuts 5,061 7,326 4,000 4,750 
 % GDP 3.0% 4.4% 2. 4% 2.9% 
     
It is assumed that in both 2009 and 2010, the budget numbers take 
account of a fall in the price of building and construction investment 
resulting in a saving of around €1 billion. In addition, the volume of public 
investment is assumed to be reduced by around €0.5 billion as projects are 
re-phased to take account of the lower than expected growth in the 
economy and lower expected levels of congestion in the use of public 
infrastructure. 
 
It is assumed that no further fiscal policy interventions occur beyond 
2010, in effect, that a neutral fiscal policy is pursued. That means that tax 
rates are held constant (or indexed in the case of specific taxes) and tax 
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bands are also indexed. It is assumed that there is no change in public 
service numbers over the full period. (This might in other contexts be 
considered to be a non-neutral assumption as it implies a fall in the share 
of public goods provision in the economy between 2011 and 2015.) 
Transfers adjust to take account of changing numbers unemployed. Also 
rates of transfers are indexed. These assumptions contrast with the 
government’s stated intention that it will continue to raise taxes and cut 
expenditure in each of the following years out to 2013. 
 
 This scenario is based on the public finance assumptions and 
assumptions on world economic conditions outlined in Sections 4.2 and 
4.3. Following two years of significant contraction in economic activity in 
2009 and 2010, we expect economic growth to resume from 2011 onwards. 
This is predicated on the assumption that the world economy, and hence 
world demand for Irish exports, will have recovered from the current 
slowdown by 2011.  
4.4  
World 
Recovery 
Scenario 
 
The strong recovery in the Irish economy after 2011 envisaged in the 
World Recovery scenario can be explained by two factors. First, the openness 
of the Irish economy ensures that an increase in world activity has a 
substantial effect on Irish output. Growth in world trade directly affects the 
Irish economy through the manufacturing, business and financial services 
and tourism sectors. The internationalisation of business services has 
increased substantially the combined effect (through all channels) of 
growth in world demand on the Irish economy. It is this relatively high 
degree of responsiveness to changes in world activity which gives rise to 
the strong recovery in the Irish economy from 2011– just as it contributed 
to the sharpness of the downturn earlier. 
Figure 8: GNP, Growth Rates 
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The second factor which fuels the growth in the Irish economy after 
2011 in this scenario is the expected improvement in competitiveness in 
Ireland relative to the rest of the world.  Domestic competitiveness relative 
to the rest of the world determines what share of world output is produced 
in Ireland. Real after tax wage rates in Ireland are, inter alia, a function of 
the CPI and wage rates in the UK. The increase in unemployment 
associated with the contraction in economic activity over the period 2008 
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to 2010 is expected to lead to significant wage moderation in the private 
sector. This scenario takes into account the pensions levy introduced in 
January 2009, which effectively reduces wage rates in the public sector. As 
a result the standard model suggests that nominal wage rates in the 
economy as a whole could decline by a cumulative 6.0 per cent over the 
period 2009 to 2011. This significant improvement in competitiveness 
relative to the rest of the Euro Area will help drive the growth in GNP 
over the period from 2011 to 2015.  As illustrated in a separate simulation 
exercise, Irish manufacturing output shows a supply elasticity of unity 
when faced with a 1 percentage point improvement in competitiveness 
(Bergin et al., 2009).  
 
For 2009 and 2010, the recession in the international economy, in 
addition to falling domestic demand, leads to a substantial fall in output in 
the manufacturing and market services sectors. Overall GNP is expected to 
fall by over 9.4 per cent in 2009 and almost 1 per cent in 2010 (Table 7). 
The recovery in the international economy assumed in the World Recovery 
scenario, in addition to the improvement in Irish competitiveness, is 
expected to give rise to a strong recovery in both sectors over the period 
2010 to 2015 as illustrated in Figure 8. As shown in Table 7, average wage 
rates, which are expected to continue falling into 2011, are forecast to rise 
by something over 3 per cent a year in the period 2010-2015. As a result of 
the world recovery and the improvement in competitiveness, GNP growth 
is expected to resume, averaging 5.4 per cent between 2010 and 2015 
before moderating to an annual average rate of 3.2 per cent for the 
remainder of the period, close to its long-run potential rate of growth.   
Table 7: World Recovery Scenario: Major Aggregates12 
     
 2009 2010 2010-15 2015-20 
 Annual % Growth Rate Average Annual % Growth 
GDP -8.2 -1.0 5.6 3.3 
GNP -9.4 -0.8 5.4 3.2 
Total Employment -9.4 -6.1 3.0 1.1 
Output, industry -9.7 -2.1 8.4 3.8 
Output, market services -7.6 -0.1 5.8 3.2 
Consumer Prices -1.0 -0.2 2.6 2.6 
Non-agricultural Wage Rates -2.5 -1.4 3.2 4.2 
Year End: 2009 2010        2015       2020 
Personal Savings Ratio 11.7 13.3 8.5 7.1 
General Government Balance, % GDP -11.8 -11.2 -3.3 -2.4 
Net Government Debt, % of GDP 34.2 46.2 71.4 71.6 
General Government Debt, % GDP 57.5 70.3 81.8 81.3 
Balance of Payments, % GNP -0.8 2.6 3.5 4.0 
Unemployment Rate, % of labour force 13.3 17.2 6.4 6.3 
Net Migration, 000s         30         30         -13         -20 
     
 
 
12 The numbers for 2009 and 2010 are generated by the HERMES model. The model has 
been roughly calibrated so as to reproduce the major aggregates of the Quarterly Economic 
Commentary published in April 2009. However, there are some remaining differences. 
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Once the world recovery picks up momentum it will begin to impact on 
Ireland. Current international forecasts suggest that this could happen in 
2011. In this recovery phase growth rates of 5 to 6 per cent would be likely.  
However, this would not be a return to the heady days of the 1990s but 
would reflect a restoration of only some of the losses sustained over the 
period 2008-10. It would still leave the long-term loss of output as a result 
of the recession at around 10 per cent. 
 
The sharp slowdown in the economy in the years 2008 to 2010 is 
expected to result in a dramatic rise in unemployment and the 
unemployment rate, as illustrated in Figure 9. As a result of lower levels of 
activity in the building, manufacturing and market services sectors total 
employment is expected to fall by 9.4 per cent in 2009 and by a further 6.1 
per cent in 2010. The unemployment rate is expected to exceed 13 per cent 
in 2009 before peaking at around 17 per cent in 2010. In line with the 
anticipated recovery in economic activity from 2011 onwards, employment 
growth is expected to resume and average 3.0 per cent over the period 
2010 to 2015. As a result, the unemployment rate is expected to fall to 6.4 
per cent by 2015 and 6.3 per cent by 2020.  
Figure 9: Unemployment Rate, Per Cent of the Labour Force 
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Source: ESRI Databank and results of model simulations. 
 
Significantly, the economy is not expected to return to full 
employment13 in the World Recovery scenario. This mirrors the experience of 
the Finnish economy in the 1990s where the unemployment rate still stood 
at 11 per cent in 1999, five years after the revival of economic growth 
began. The persistence of a high unemployment rate in Ireland long after 
the economy has recovered would reflect a legacy of a structural 
unemployment problem left behind by the current severe recession and in 
particular the re-adjustment of the construction sector of the economy 
back to a more sustainable scale. To minimise the risk of such an outcome, 
action should be taken in the next few years to provide adequate training to 
fit the unemployed for the jobs of the future. In addition, action may be 
13 Full employment here refers to pre-recession unemployment rates, averaging 
approximately 5 per cent of the labour force. 
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needed to ensure that poverty traps are minimised allowing those who are 
long-term unemployed to avail of the job opportunities which an economic 
recovery will bring. 
 
Throughout these simulations migration is assumed to be driven by 
movements in after-tax wage rates and the unemployment rate in Ireland 
relative to alternative EU labour markets. However, with a world-wide 
recession the propensity to migrate for a given wage differential may well 
fall. If migration were not to resume, this would lead to a higher 
unemployment rate and a slower decline in the unemployment rate during 
the recovery period than we have assumed here. In this scenario, 
emigration is assumed to reach a peak in 2012 at over 40,000 before 
reverting to limited net immigration in the second half of the next decade. 
The cumulative net emigration of almost 116,000 over the period 2009 to 
2015 assumed in this scenario represents a significant reduction in the 
labour force as a result of the current severe recession.  
 
Households have already reacted to the current economic crisis by 
dramatically increasing their personal savings rate. This is illustrated in 
Figure 10. The savings rate is expected to stand at 13 per cent in 2010, the 
highest level since 1978. This rise in the savings rate has a counterpart in an 
increased government deficit reflecting the fact that domestic consumption 
has a substantial tax content. As the economy recovers after 2011, the 
savings rate is expected to fall back gradually to reach 8.5 per cent in 2015 
and 7.1 per cent in 2020. The fall in the savings ratio and the associated rise 
in consumption will add further impetus to the recovery in the economy 
after 2011 and it will make a contribution, albeit limited, to restoring 
balance to the public finances. 
Figure 10: Personal Savings Ratio, Per Cent 
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Source: ESRI Databank and results of model simulations. 
 
For every 1 percentage point reduction in government borrowing 
through discretionary fiscal action the balance of payments current account 
deficit (surplus) also tends to fall (rise) by around 1 percentage point  (see 
Bergin et al. 2009).  The fiscal action taken by the government in January 
and April, together with the expected budget for 2010, will tend to push 
the balance of payments current account into surplus in 2010. As any 
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recovery in the Irish economy is likely to occur initially through a recovery 
in world demand, increasing the demand for Irish exports, the period after 
2010 is likely to see a substantial continuing surplus on the current account 
of the balance of payments. In this scenario the combined effect of these 
forces would see the balance of payments surplus, currently forecast to be 
2.6 per cent of GNP in 2010, increasing to 4.0 per cent by 2015.  
 
The significant continuing balance of payments surplus will see the Irish 
economy increasing its net foreign financial asset position. The increased 
borrowing by the government will be more than offset by increased 
investment (or reduction in debt) by the private sector. A significant share 
of this net external investment (loan repayment) will occur through the 
banking system. As a result, the net foreign liabilities of the banking system 
can be expected to fall dramatically during the recovery period.  
 
On the public finances, the lower level of economic activity and 
employment is likely to reduce government receipts from a range of taxes. 
At the same time, government expenditure is expected to rise due to higher 
welfare payments arising from the increase in unemployment and a major 
increase in debt interest payments. Taking into account the fiscal measures 
for 2009 and Budget 2010 announced to date, the general government 
balance as a percentage of GDP is expected to reach -11.8 per cent in 2009 
and -11.2 per cent in 2010. As noted above, given the paucity of 
information, it is not possible to take account here of the need to restore 
order to the banking system and the consequent costs to the economy. 
This issue was discussed separately in Section 3.3. 
 
As a consequence of the high level of borrowing, the net government 
debt to GDP ratio would rise to 46 per cent in 2010 and 71 per cent by 
2015.14 However, the resumption of significant economic growth after 
2011 would be likely to bring about a substantial increase in government 
revenue from taxation, even without further fiscal policy action after 2010. 
The rise in employment would bring about an increase in income tax 
revenue while the fall in unemployment would reduce government welfare 
payments. This would result in a significant improvement in the general 
government balance, which would fall to -3.3 per cent of GDP by 2015 as 
shown in Figure 11. This is the deficit that would remain, assuming a 
normal world recovery beginning in 2011 and no further fiscal policy 
action after 2010. On the basis of this scenario, to eliminate government 
borrowing fully by 2015 would require some limited further fiscal policy 
action in the intervening period. 
 
 
14 This is the net debt.  It is derived by deducting from the general government debt liquid 
assets consisting of deposits with the Central Bank together with the NPRF, the SIF and a 
number of other funds. In 2008 the gross debt figures was 41.3 per cent of GDP while the 
net debt figure was 20 per cent of GDP, 40 billion lower. 
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Figure 11: General Government Balance, Per Cent of GDP 
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Source: ESRI Databank and results of model simulations. 
 
The housing market will see some recovery too in the period after 2011. 
However, as discussed in Box 1, it will never recover the level of output 
seen in the boom years 2005-7. Nonetheless, the level of output needed to 
meet the demands of the population will be significant. 
 
Since there is growing appreciation of the need to take account of 
environmental sustainability in the pattern of recover, we provide an 
estimate of the effects of this World Recovery scenario on emissions of 
greenhouse gases in Appendix 2.  It shows that, as a result of the recession, 
Ireland may be close to complying with its target for emissions under the 
Kyoto protocol.   
  
Box 1: The Housing Market 
by David Duffy 
Domestically one of the main reasons behind the decline in economic 
growth has been the sharp fall in activity in the housing market. The 
residential component of the construction sector increased in size to such 
an extent that the Irish economy was exposed to both a house price and a 
residential output shock. The recovery outlined above suggests that the 
Irish economy will return to growth in 2011. However, the housing market 
is expected to lag this recovery and growth in housing demand is unlikely 
to take place until households become more positive in their expectation 
about the economic outlook and job security.  
 
 
House prices have now been declining since the first half of 2007. 
Given the scale of the downturn in the economy, we expect that house 
prices will fall by around 35 per cent from their peak in 2007 (a drop of 
almost 50 per cent in real terms). On the basis of the economic outlook the 
trough in nominal prices is assumed to occur around the end of 2010 or 
the beginning of 2011. For the period 2010-2015 nominal house prices are 
expected to show little change.  
 
 
Having peaked at over 93,000 dwellings completed in 2006, 22 per 
thousand population, it now seems likely that less than 20,000 units will be 
completed in 2009 and again in 2010 (Figure 1). However, many of the 
fundamentals that underpin the housing market remain in place and so, as 
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the economy recovers, the volume of completions is expected to rise to an 
annual average of over 30,000 between 2010 and 2015.  
 
Figure 1: Housing Completions, 000 
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Source: ESRI Databank and results of model simulations. 
 
 
This forecast for housing completions is based on an assumption of no 
change in headship and no additions to the stock of vacant dwellings over 
the period. However, other data suggests that this outlook may err on the 
pessimistic side. Figure 2 shows the annual change in the number of 
households, based on estimates by the CSO QNHS (Quarterly National 
Household Survey). The most recent data show that the number of 
households in quarter 4, 2008 was approximately 60,000 higher than the 
same period in 2007. This reflects a significant increase in headship rates – 
the proportion of each group who are “head” of an independent 
household. This strength of household formation in 2007 and 2008 is 
surprising. A possible explanation is that headship rates, which are low in 
Ireland relative to the rest of the EU-15, may be beginning to converge on 
rates in other EU-15 countries now that rents are falling rapidly. Also the 
high rate of household formation is affected by the relative youth of 
Ireland’s population.  
 
 
Based on these numbers for household formation, combined with the 
expectation that Irish headship rates will converge on UK rates by 2021 we 
have produced a decomposition of the demand for housing by its main 
components – see Table 1. In addition to rising headship rates, this 
decomposition takes account of a return to limited net immigration that is 
anticipated in the period after 2015. When the sources of demand are 
added together this would suggest a demand for more than 40,000 
dwellings a year over the period 2012-21 (see Total in Table 1). This is 
substantially higher than the number of completions generated in the World 
Recovery forecast. If this proved to be the case then the economy would in 
fact require a higher number of dwellings in the future than is anticipated 
in the World Recovery forecast. 
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Figure 2: Change in Number of Households 
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Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Decomposition of Housing Demand, Thousands 
       
  1991-1996 1997-2002 2003-06 2007-11 2012-16 2017-21 
Population Growth 16.5 20.0 19.8 27.9 31.2 18.7 
Change in Headship 3.1 0.9 8.2 8.0 5.1 16.9 
Migration 0.0 5.9 17.5 3.3 -3.2 8.3 
Vacant 0.1 6.4 16.1 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Obsolescence 4.9 11.6 13.4 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Total 24.7 44.8 74.8 46.3 40.2 55.9 
Dwellings Forecast    36.4 31.5 33.2 
       
 
 The World Recovery scenario set out in Section 4.4 was predicated on the 
assumption of a world recovery taking hold in 2010. This is currently the 
consensus view among the main international forecasting institutions such 
as the OECD, NIESR and the IMF.  It is based on the belief that the large 
macroeconomic stimulus around the world combined with the assistance to 
financial systems will drive a timid recovery in 2010 which will become well 
established in 2011. However, given the conditions pertaining in the 
current international economic environment there remains a substantial 
degree of uncertainty surrounding the likely length and depth of the current 
recession. In this scenario we consider the impact of a more severe 
slowdown in the world economy by assuming that the world recession will 
persist into 2012 (see Section 4.2 above for details).  
4.5 
Prolonged 
Recession 
Scenario 
 
Table 8 summarises the impact of this shock on the key economic 
aggregates. Obviously, the overall impact of the shock would be to delay 
further rather than prevent the recovery in economic activity in Ireland. 
Reflecting Ireland’s heavy exposure to the world economy, the effect of the 
shock would be to reduce significantly external demand for Irish output 
and exports in 2011 leading to lower output and employment. Under this 
scenario, output in the industrial sector would grow by 7.2 per cent a year 
between 2010 and 2015, down from 8.4 per cent a year in the World Recovery 
scenario. This would leave the level of industrial output almost 7 per cent 
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lower than in the World Recovery scenario in 2015. The increase in market 
services output would be 5.0 per cent a year compared to 5.8 per cent in 
the World Recovery scenario. 
Table 8: Prolonged Recession Simulation Results: Major Aggregates 
 
   2009   2010 2010-15 2015-20 
 
 
Annual % Growth     
Rate 
Average Annual % 
Growth 
GDP -8.2 -1.3 4.8 3.2 
GNP -9.4 -1.0 4.7 3.2 
Total Employment -9.4 -6.2 2.8 1.1 
Output, industry -9.7 -2.5 7.2 3.7 
Output, market services -7.6 -0.3 5.0 3.1 
Consumer Prices -1.0 -0.4 2.4 2.6 
Non-ag. Wage Rates -2.5 -1.7 2.4 4.4 
Year End:   2009   2010   2015   2020 
Personal Savings Ratio 11.7 13.3 8.3 7.0 
General Government Balance, % GDP -11.8 -11.3 -4.9 -4.2 
Net Government Debt, % of GDP 34.2 46.5 79.2 82.6 
General Government Debt, % GDP 57.5 70.6 89.5 92.2 
Balance of Payments, % GNP -0.8 2.4 1.2 1.2 
Unemployment Rate 13.3 17.4 6.8 6.9 
Net Migration, 000s 30 30    -11     -22 
 
In the case of GNP the average growth rate would be reduced to 4.7 per 
cent a year from 5.4 per cent. In each case the bulk of the fall relative to 
the World Recovery scenario would occur in 2011 and 2012. This would 
mean that the level of GDP would end up around 4 per cent lower than in 
the World Recovery scenario in 2015, as illustrated in Figure 12, while the 
reduction in the level of GNP would be around 3.4 per cent.  
Figure 12: Prolonged Recession and Growth:  Effect of One Year Delay in 
International Recovery on Level of GNP and GDP Compared to 
World Recovery  
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The delay in the world recovery would inflict further damage on the 
potential output of the Irish economy as shown in Figure 12. It would be 
unlikely that the additional ground lost by the extension of the world 
recession into 2011 would be made up later in the decade. 
 
Despite emigration, the additional decline in activity would mean that 
the unemployment rate would remain higher for significantly longer under 
the Prolonged Recession scenario compared with the World Recovery scenario. 
Figure 13 shows the additional unemployment in this scenario. The 
addition to the unemployment rate would be at its greatest in 2012 at an 
additional 1.5 percentage points. However, the higher unemployment 
would induce increased emigration, as shown in Figure 14. By 2015 
cumulative net emigration would be around 23,000 higher than in the World 
Recovery scenario. This increase in net emigration together with the reduced 
levels of output and employment would represent permanent losses to the 
economy.  
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Figure 13: Prolonged Recession and Unemployment: Effect of One Year 
Delay in International Recovery on Unemployment Rate 
Compared to World Recovery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher unemployment would also result in the growth in wage rates 
over the period 2010-2015 being 2.4 per cent a year compared to 3.2 per 
cent a year in the World Recovery scenario. The higher emigration and the 
lower wage rates would see the differential between the unemployment rate 
in the Prolonged Recession and the World Recovery scenarios falling over time so 
that the unemployment rate in 2015 under this scenario would be back 
down to 6.8 per cent of the labour force compared to 6.4 per cent in the 
World Recovery scenario. 
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Figure 14: Prolonged Recession and Emigration: Effect of One Year Delay 
in International Recovery on Net Emigration Compared to 
World Recovery  
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One of the most significant effects of this shock would be its impact on 
the public finances as shown in Figure 15. The lower level of economic 
activity arising from the prolonged world recession would reduce 
government revenue from taxation while the higher unemployment rate 
and borrowing would increase government expenditure on welfare 
payments and interest payments. This would result in a significant 
deterioration in the general government balance compared to the World 
Recovery scenario as shown in Figure 15.  By  2015  the general  government 
balance as a percentage of GDP under the Prolonged Recession scenario 
would stand at 4.9 per cent compared to 3.3 per cent in the World Recovery. 
While the deficit in the World Recovery would approach the 3 per cent 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) limit by 2015, with a delayed world 
recovery there would still be a substantially higher deficit by the end of the 
period. By 2015 the net debt GDP ratio would be 8 percentage points 
higher  under  the  Prolonged  Recession  scenario  compared  with  the  World  
Figure 15: General Government Balance as a Per Cent of GDP 
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Recovery scenario. This would suggest the need for further remedial action in 
2011 and 2012.  
 
 As ever, when forecasting a number of years ahead, there are significant 
uncertainties surrounding the resultant scenarios.  Such uncertainties stem 
from both the underlying assumptions about key drivers of the economy, 
such as world growth and fiscal policy, and also from the possibility of 
changes in the underlying behaviour of the economy embedded in 
whatever model is used.15 These problems are well-known and well-
rehearsed. However, at present there is an exceptional level of uncertainty 
surrounding the future prospects for the world economy, and for individual 
major economies.  
4.6 
Risks to the 
Forecast 
Scenarios 
 
In this paper we have tried to capture some of this uncertainty by 
developing two different scenarios for the world and the Irish economy out 
to 2015. However, even these two scenarios do not capture the full range 
of the risks and possibilities currently faced by the Irish economy. As a 
result, in this Section we consider a number of these “uncertainties” and 
what their implications are for the scenarios set out in this paper. The first 
concerns uncertainty about the future path of the world economy. The 
second concerns the execution of domestic fiscal policy. The third 
concerns the sensitivity of our results to alternative outcomes on domestic 
competitiveness. The fourth concerns uncertainty about labour market 
behaviour. The fifth concerns the possibility of deflation and the last 
concerns uncertainty about the impact of the banking crisis on the Irish 
economy. 
 
To facilitate this work using the HERMES macroeconomic model we 
draw on research already in the public domain in the form of an ESRI 
Working Paper that analyses how the Irish economy might respond to 
changes in individual exogenous variables (Bergin, Conefrey, Fitz Gerald 
and Kearney, 2009). These “multipliers” or “shocks” to the model along a 
range of dimensions can be used to explore how changes in our 
assumptions might affect key aggregates such as growth and 
unemployment.  
Table 9: Long-Run Impact of 1 Per Cent Increase in Variables in HERMES 
     
  World 
Output 
Irish 
Competitiveness 
Irish Labour 
Costs 
GDP, % Change 1.1 0.5 -0.3 
GNP, % Change 1.1 0.1 -0.1 
Labour force, % Change 0.4 0.1 0.2 
Unemployment, % labour force -0.1 -0.2 0.6 
General government balance, % 
of GDP 1.4 0.3 -0.1 
Balance of Payments % of GDP 0.4 0.5 -0.2 
    
 
 
15 Here we use the HERMES macro-economic model of the Irish economy. However, 
even when there is no formal model, analysts carry an implicit model in their heads when 
they project future trends. 
 
  PATHS TO RECOVERY 41 
In Table 9 we show summary results from Bergin, Conefrey, Fitz 
Gerald and Kearney (2009), for a 1 per cent change in certain key variables: 
world output, Irish competitiveness and Irish wage rates. (Table 9 shows 
the results for an increase in each variable but the results for a fall would be 
identical to that shown in Table 9 but with the opposite sign.) Within 
reasonable ranges these multipliers provide guidance as to the impact on 
Ireland of alternative outcomes on world growth or competitiveness. This 
analysis can then be used by readers to develop simple alternative 
scenarios. 
 
The first uncertainty concerns the nature and the timing of a future 
world recovery. As discussed in Section 4.2, the international consensus is 
that the world economy should show signs of recovery by the second half 
of 2010. Nevertheless, there is significant doubt surrounding the timing of 
this recovery, and also concerning its likely strength. Some of the doubts 
are related to the ongoing difficulties involved in restoring order to the 
international financial system and some of it is related to the loss of 
consumer and investor confidence that has occurred over the past twelve 
months. If the current upheaval in international financial markets were to 
prove prolonged, this would delay the World and hence the Irish recovery, 
as illustrated in the Prolonged Recession scenario. However, a failure to deal 
with the financial crisis could instead see a recovery which was both 
delayed and which was much more muted than existing models would 
suggest.  
 
In the Prolonged Recession scenario, by 2015 a prolongation of the 
recession of one further year would imply significant permanent costs to 
the Irish economy: GDP would be 4 percentage points lower, a cumulative 
increase in net emigration of 23,000 and an increase in the structural deficit 
of almost 1.5 percentage points of GDP. The clear implication of these 
results is that if the world recovery were to be delayed for several years, the 
costs to the Irish economy would be very substantial. 
 
If the world recovery began in 2011 but it was less robust than we have 
assumed, this would affect the long-term growth potential of the Irish 
economy. As shown in Table 9, for every 1 percentage point that world 
output in 2015 fell short of expectations, Irish GDP would be around 1.1 
per cent below the level in our World Recovery scenario. In turn this shortfall 
would see the unemployment rate in 2015 being 0.1 percentage points 
higher and the structural deficit would be higher by 1.4 percentage points 
of GDP. 
While most of the risks in relation to the world recovery currently 
appear to be on the downside, there is still some possibility of a pleasant 
surprise. If short-term forecasts of major institutions are to be believed the 
world recovery could begin at the end of 2009. In that case the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook “benign” scenario could prove appropriate which 
would see higher world growth than we have assumed in our World Recovery 
scenario, especially in our trading partners. If this happened the recovery in 
Ireland might be stronger in 2011 than we have anticipated and the 
reduction in unemployment by 2015 would also be greater. The figures in 
Table 9 can be used to quantify what this upside might be if it happened. 
 
The second uncertainty concerns the “political economy” of the 
adjustment under way in the Irish economy. In policy terms, the World 
Recovery scenario presented in Section 4.4 assumes full implementation of 
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the Supplementary Budget measures announced for both 2009 and 2010. 
While these represent an historically large fiscal adjustment, both in terms 
of taxation increases and expenditure cuts, the results of this paper 
highlight the need for such an adjustment to restore order to the public 
finances and to restore investor confidence in the economy. Were the fiscal 
correction to falter, or even halt in the course of 2009 and 2010, this could 
do serious long-term damage to the ability of the Irish economy to benefit 
from the world recovery when it occurs. Clearly, the level of cuts involved 
will be challenging to implement both at a political and an institutional 
level. In this context it is important that both policymakers and individual 
citizens are made aware of the long-term benefits of such a fiscal 
consolidation.  
 
As highlighted in Figure 2 of this paper, the lost output through the 
underperformance of the economy in the 1980s was very substantial. In 
assuming that the fiscal adjustment takes place along planned lines we 
expect the lost output this time round to be much less (the shaded area in 
Figure 2). However, serious slippage could see a prolongation of the 
current crisis so that the loss in output could instead approach that of the 
1980s. 
 
The analysis in this paper suggests that the current recession could see 
Ireland gain substantial labour cost competitiveness by 2011 relative to its 
Euro Area partners, which will in turn help boost the performance of Irish 
firms in the upturn. The third uncertainty concerns this prospective 
improvement in competitiveness. In the World Recovery scenario the 
standard model of wage formation would suggest that nominal wage rates 
will fall by a cumulative 6 per cent over the three years 2009-11. However, 
we have never seen such a fall in nominal wage rates and there remains 
some uncertainty as to whether the labour market will prove “normal” in 
this way. As shown in Table 9, for every 1 percentage point that wage rates 
are above the forecast level, the long-term impact on GDP would be to 
reduce it by 0.3 per cent and the long-term impact on unemployment 
would be to raise it by 0.6 percentage points.  
 
Wage costs are only one component of competitiveness. Table 9 also 
shows the effect of an improvement in Irish competitiveness of 1 per cent. 
This simulation incorporates a 1 percentage point reduction in wage rates 
as well as a similar reduction in all relevant Irish prices. To the extent that 
the price level as a whole adjusted downwards more rapidly than we have 
anticipated through enhanced competition, this could have quite a strong 
positive impact on the economy. This highlights the long-term importance 
of policies to promote competition, even if there are some short-term costs 
for the sectors affected. 
 
The fourth uncertainty concerns the behaviour of the labour market. 
Our model of migration behaviour is based on past experience. While we 
anticipate significant cumulative net emigration of 150,000 over the period 
2009 to 2015, this forecast could be affected by the very adverse 
circumstances in other labour markets. If emigration were to be lower than 
anticipated, this would raise unemployment in the period 2011-15 above 
the level we have anticipated. However, it would also put some limited 
downward pressure on wage rates and domestic costs. If the world 
recovery were to prove more robust, falling unemployment in competing 
labour markets could even increase the numbers leaving Ireland. 
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As well as uncertainty about the possible response of migration, there 
must be concerns that the expected very high level of unemployment in 
2010-11 could lead to a permanent increase in the numbers of long-term 
unemployed. In our scenarios we have assumed that this does not happen. 
However, as discussed in Section 2, the Finnish experience was that after 
the major shock to its economy in the early 1990s the rate of 
unemployment never returned to its pre-existing very low level. To ensure 
that an economic recovery does see a return to full employment it will be 
important to adopt suitable labour market policies (O’Connell, 2009). 
 
The fifth possible concern with our scenarios relates to the possible 
danger of deflation. Because of the anchor provided by the Euro we do not 
see this as posing a serious danger for the Irish economy. While we 
anticipate a substantial fall in the price level in Ireland of 5 per cent or 
more, provided that the Euro Area as a whole continues to experience 
positive inflation, the Irish economy will eventually revert to a low but 
positive inflation rate.  
 
The final uncertainty identified above concerns the resolution of the 
banking crisis. If action to resolve the problem with the banking system 
were indefinitely delayed, leaving “zombie” banks to recapitalise 
themselves, the Irish recovery might not happen even if the world recovery 
were to proceed. Hence, there is great urgency in restoring the Irish 
banking system to working order. There is also the danger that the 
government could overpay for a resolution of the crisis. In both these cases 
it is very difficult to quantify the possible risks. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
doing nothing is not an option and that rapid action is to be preferred if 
the economy is to be fit for recovery. 
 
There remains the possibility that the fabric of the economy may have 
been so changed that it might not respond to a world recovery in the way 
that it did in the past. With lower prospective FDI inflows into the EU the 
external environment may also be different than in the past. However, 
there is no evidence at this time that there has been such a change in the 
behaviour of the Irish economy. Key parts of the tradable sector have 
performed relatively well, in recent years in spite of cost disadvantages (Fitz 
Gerald (ed.), 2008). Even over the last year (to February 2009) exports and 
output in the high-tech sectors of the economy have proved reasonably 
robust, at least by comparison with our neighbours. Our model of the 
tradable sector of the economy suggests that, with a return to world growth 
and an improvement in relative competitiveness, output will respond as it 
has done in the past. Even before the recession the structure of the 
economy was already developing to reflect the changing nature of the 
world economy and the evolution of Ireland’s endowment of skills. This 
process will certainly continue in the recovery phase. Obviously such a 
recovery would benefit from increased policy attention to enhancing 
productivity and innovation in the tradable sector of the economy. 
However, such policies take time to develop and implement successfully.  
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 At the time of writing this paper (May 2009), our view is that the World 
Recovery scenario is the most likely outturn for the period to 2015. This is 
based both on the assessment of international forecasting agencies, and on 
the evidence in recent months of domestic policy action to tackle the 
structural deficit and the banking crisis. In the World Recovery scenario it is 
assumed that the international economy will begin to recover from the 
current severe recession in 2011. However, it is quite possible that this 
recovery could be delayed by a year and consequently, we have also 
explored the consequences of such a postponed world recovery in a 
Prolonged Recession scenario. The gap between the two forecasts for the 
period 2011 to 2015 is quite large indicating the considerable uncertainty 
that is involved in any forecast of turning points in the economic cycle. 
However, the two scenarios imply very similar forecasts for the average 
growth over the forecast period beyond 2015.  
4.7 
Implications 
 
Even if Ireland faces significant challenges in the short term, it has the 
potential to achieve an average growth rate of over 5 per cent over the 
years 2010 to 2015. A world recovery beginning in 2011 would bring about 
a significant reduction in the unemployment rate. The World Recovery 
scenario implies a structural budget deficit of between 3 and 4 per cent if 
the measures announced in the Supplementary Budget for 2010 are 
implemented. However, this estimate does not take account of the 
medium-term cost of government intervention to help restore the banking 
system.  
 
As discussed in Section 3.3 the national debt interest on borrowing to 
deal with the banking crisis could eventually add up to 2 percentage points 
to this. However, when account is taken of special levies on the banks (to 
pay for government guarantees etc.) and potential dividends, the net cost 
could be around 1 per cent. While all of this cost may eventually be 
recouped when the assets (held by NAMA and the banks) are sold, the 
debt interest payments will have to be funded in the interim. If anything, 
this would argue for more ambition in tackling the structural deficit.   
 
The Prolonged Recession scenario considers the possibility that the current 
slowdown in the world economy will last longer than in the World Recovery 
scenario. In this scenario the economy underperforms significantly in the 
short run leading to lower output and employment and higher net 
emigration compared to the World Recovery scenario. This would add to the 
problems facing the public finances implying more severe action by the 
government on spending and taxation levels in the years 2011-15.  
 
There remains the possibility that the economy could recover from the 
current severe recession and return more quickly to the growth trajectory 
described in the World Recovery. If the world recovery proved stronger than 
expected, mirroring the extreme nature of the decline in output in 2008 and 
2009, this would have positive implications for the strength of the Irish 
recovery.  In effect we would have a recession described as being more V-
shaped than U-shaped. 
 
With a structural deficit of between 3 and 4 percentage points of GDP 
at the end of 2010, and taking account of the potential costs of the reform 
of the financial system, there will still be a need to take significant fiscal 
action to eliminate borrowing by 2015. This could imply discretionary fiscal 
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action to reduce borrowing by around 1 percentage point a year over the 
period. (By way of illustration, ex ante the cuts in 2009 and 2010 amount to 
7.3 per cent of GDP.) The uncertainties about the timing of the recovery 
mean that planning should still continue for quite a tight fiscal policy over 
the years 2011-13, as currently envisaged by the Department of Finance in 
their Macro-Economic and Fiscal Framework: 2009-13. However, if over the 
course of the next eighteen months (mid-2009 to end-2010) the World 
Recovery scenario appears to be correct, it would then be appropriate to plan 
for a less stringent (though still deflationary) fiscal policy over the course of 
the period 2011-13. Also, if the problems in the banking system were 
resolved within a tighter time scale, so that the disposal of the relevant 
assets began before 2015, this could also ease fiscal pressures by realising 
some of the State capital to be invested in the banking system. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The Irish economy is facing extremely challenging times. It is in the 
throes of a deep recession, unemployment is rising rapidly and the Irish 
banking system is facing serious funding difficulties. As made clear in the 
Spring 2009 Quarterly Economic Commentary, this situation is likely to persist 
into 2010 with output continuing to fall, albeit at a slower pace. However, 
our assessment is that while substantial damage has been done to the 
economy, it still remains reasonably robust. With the forecast substantial 
improvement in competitiveness in 2009, 2010 and into 2011, the Irish 
economy is repositioning itself to benefit from a world recovery.  
 
Our assessment is that if the world economy recovers significant 
momentum by 2011, the Irish economy will be likely to grow quite rapidly 
in the 2011-2015 period, recovering some of the lost ground of the current 
recession. While the return to growth will see some improvement in living 
standards after 2011, it seems clear that this recovery will also still leave 
output and living standards approximately 10 per cent lower than they 
would have been without the current crisis. This will represent a very 
painful “scar” on the economy. Under these circumstances, while the rate 
of unemployment can be expected to fall quite rapidly from a peak at the 
end of 2010, without further action it will still not have returned to “full 
employment” by 2015. 
 
These estimates are based on a world recovery in 2011. If the world 
recovery were delayed a year to 2012, we estimate that the permanent loss 
of output and income could be closer to 15 per cent, the fall in the rate of 
unemployment would be further delayed and there would be higher 
emigration. 
 
The dramatic deterioration in the public finances in 2008 and 2009 
posed a very serious dilemma. While under more normal circumstances the 
economic prescription might have been to let the “automatic stabilisers” 
work and to eliminate the deficit once the economy was recovering, the 
current situation made that a wholly inappropriate response for several 
reasons. First, the sheer magnitude of the deterioration meant that 
corrective action was inescapable – if not tackled the problem could have 
become explosive. Second, research has shown that early action in such 
cases produces substantial benefits through restoring the confidence of 
consumers and investors. Third, and related to the confidence issue, the 
uncertainty created by the massive borrowing has greatly added to the 
interest rate paid by the government. Early action to tackle the problem 
holds out the prospect of an earlier reduction in the risk premium for Irish 
borrowing, with a beneficial long-term impact on the economy. Fourth, 
while the bulk of the costs of dealing with the banking crisis may eventually 
be recouped by the tax payer, the high level of debt in the intervening years 
increases the uncertainty concerning the public finances. This too argues  
for early rather than delayed action. 
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The large structural deficit that was apparent prior to the April 2009 
Budget largely reflected the legacy of unwise fiscal policies in recent years. 
Against this background the authorities have taken steps to address the 
rapid deterioration in the public finances since the autumn of 2008. We 
have argued that the appropriate target for fiscal policy is the structural 
deficit and this approach has been adopted by the government. We 
estimate that the measures introduced for 2009 will begin to reduce the 
structural deficit. Clearly, it is essential that the Budget for 2010 should 
achieve the additional reduction in the structural deficit that the 
government have already announced. Assuming the announced 2010 
budgetary measures are implemented, the fiscal tightening over 2009 and 
2010 is likely to bring the structural deficit from an estimated 7-8 per cent 
of GDP to an estimated 3-4 per cent of GDP. This seems to us to be an 
appropriate response to the very serious problems posed for the economy 
by the public finance crisis. 
 
If the recovery were to proceed along the lines of the World Recovery 
scenario this would leave a structural deficit of 3 to 4 per cent of GDP to 
be eliminated over the years 2011-2015. This task would require fiscal 
action which would be much less painful than the range of budgetary 
measures currently envisaged by the Department of Finance as being 
necessary for those years. However, as indicated above in the Prolonged 
Recession scenario, if the world recovery were to be delayed a year the 
structural deficit would rise to 4-5 per cent of GDP. In that case tougher 
budgetary action from 2011 onwards would be appropriate.  
 
The experience of other countries and, in particular the experience of 
Ireland in the 1980s, suggests the importance of taking rapid action to 
tackle the unsustainable position of the public finances. As is illustrated in 
Figure 2, the delays in the 1980s resulted in the cumulative lost output (the 
shaded area in Figure 2) being very large. If instead action is taken along 
the lines proposed by the government, then under the World Recovery 
scenario the cumulative loss in output in this recession, while still very 
substantial, could be smaller than that of the 1980s. 
 
In addition to action on fiscal policy, the authorities have taken steps to 
help stabilise the banking sector. The outlook for the banking system 
suggests that the long-term cost to the State, in terms of a permanent 
increase in the debt, may be small relative to the debts accruing as a result 
of borrowing to fund the day-to-day activities of the government. 
However, even if the funding needs of the banking system were eventually 
largely repaid, the full resolution will take some considerable time. In the 
interim the very substantial overhang of debt will add to uncertainty and 
the risks facing future governments. This enhanced risk is reflected in the 
expected higher cost of borrowing by the State and, as explained above, it 
argues for accelerated action to tackle the fiscal crisis along the lines of 
current government policy.  
 
This paper has concentrated on the overall stance of fiscal policy rather 
than on its composition or on its distributional impact (Callan et al., 2009). 
However, the ultimate impact on the economy of the tightening of fiscal 
policy will depend on the composition of the increase in taxation and cuts 
in expenditure. In the case of taxation, in future budgets it would be better 
to rely less on taxes on labour (income tax and social insurance) and more 
on broadening the tax system through, for example, the introduction of a 
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property tax and a carbon tax. These taxes would have a less damaging 
impact on future employment growth. In the case of expenditure cuts, it 
will be important to concentrate on improving efficiency rather than on 
cutting valuable services. The effective cut in pay rates implemented in 
February 2009 (through the introduction of the Public Sector Pension 
Levy) was appropriate given the fact that public service wage rates were 
significantly higher than those in the private sector when allowance is made 
for the structure of employment in the two sectors (Kelly, McGuinness and 
O’Connell, 2008). Finally, even after the cuts in capital expenditure are 
implemented, public investment in infrastructure in the period 2011-13 
could still meet the likely needs of the economy if the price of such 
investment is reduced by an appropriate amount (Morgenroth, 2009). 
Given the spare capacity in the building industry, the fall in land prices and 
the downward adjustment in the national price level, the cost of 
infrastructural investment should end up very much lower than in the 
recent past and more in line with costs elsewhere in the Euro Area . It will 
be important that public policy ensures that the benefits of this fall are 
realised by the State. 
 
The analysis in this paper highlights the importance of improving the 
competitiveness of the Irish economy if it is to return to full employment 
within a reasonable time scale. We envisage a major reduction in the level 
of costs, including labour costs, relative to the Euro Area over the period 
2009-11. We see this improvement coming about through the normal 
operation of the labour market. However, we are in uncharted territory 
where the “normal” behaviour of labour costs implies a substantial fall in 
nominal wage rates mirroring the fall in other costs and prices. If nominal 
rigidities prevented this happening it could have serious consequences for 
the economy, putting in doubt the relatively robust recovery envisaged in 
the World Recovery scenario. Also, the longer the adjustment in 
competitiveness takes to play out (here we assume three years) the longer 
will be the delay in the recovery in the labour market. Hence, it is 
important that public policy should do all that it can to speed this essential 
adjustment. A revised partnership agreement which recognised the 
importance of reducing costs, broadly defined, would help in this regard.  
 
The Irish economy faces a period of very high unemployment. It will be 
very important that public policy learns from past research in Ireland and 
elsewhere on how best to prevent the unemployed of today becoming the 
long-term unemployed of tomorrow (O’Connell, 2009). This problem will 
be particularly acute for those losing their jobs who have only limited 
education. The Irish experience of the 1990s was that by raising the skill 
level in the work force, the supply of unskilled labour was sufficiently 
reduced to substantially eliminate long-term unemployment (Bergin and 
Kearney, 2007). This suggests that priority needs to be given to labour 
market initiatives that will effectively tackle this skills deficit among many 
of the unemployed.  
 
Finally, the potential output of the economy is driven not just by the 
input of domestic labour and capital but also by the technology with which 
we combine them to produce goods and services. This issue was partially 
addressed in the Government’s “Smart economy” plan launched in 
December. However, much more work is needed to identify how public 
policy can influence this key variable in the future. What will be crucial is 
that the significant sums of money still being spent on investment in 
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human capital and research and development are allocated effectively to 
enhance the future productivity of the economy, and in such a manner as 
to allow the translation of R&D expenditure into real innovation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1: 
MEASURING 
POTENTIAL OUTPUT 
Generally the potential output of an economy is the level of output 
which an economy can achieve if it makes optimal use of its resources – 
physical capital, human capital, and technology. For limited periods an 
economy can operate above potential, for example, through labour working 
abnormal hours (extra overtime). Similarly, an economy can operate below 
potential with capital being underutilised and labour unemployed. 
 
The measure of potential output in an economy is important for a 
number of reasons. It measures how fast an economy can grow under 
“normal” circumstances. The relationship between the actual level of 
output and the potential output of an economy is a guide to the 
sustainability of the current level of activity. Where output is above 
potential it suggests the presence of inflationary pressures, making such a 
level of activity unsustainable. Where output is below potential it gives an 
indication of how much of the underemployment of resources in an 
economy (e.g. unemployment) is temporary in nature. 
 
It is used to establish the normal or cyclically adjusted budget deficit. 
The cyclically adjusted deficit or surplus on the government accounts is the 
government sector’s balance at a “normal” level of activity – potential 
output. Where there would be a significant deficit if the economy were 
operating at potential this deficit is defined as being structural.  
 
There are a number of different ways of measuring the potential output 
of the economy. All of these methods aim to show what the maximum 
normal level of output would be given the endowment of resources in the 
economy. Some of them take account of the specific structure and factor 
endowments of an economy while others are little more than a rule of 
thumb. 
 
One popular measure of potential output is derived using a production 
function for an economy. Such a function describes how a given mix of 
inputs, physical and human capital, materials and technology, can be 
combined to produce national output. It is always possible for an economy 
to produce within the production frontier described by the production 
function. However, where that happens it means that the economy is 
producing less output than would be feasible with the available mix of 
inputs. It is not physically possible for an economy to produce more than 
the limit described by the production function for any sustained period of 
time. 
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This method is used by the EU Commission. However, they impose a 
specific type of production function – a Cobb Douglas – which assumes 
that the share of labour (and capital) in value added is constant. They also 
assume the same fixed factor shares for all EU-15 countries. In Ireland’s 
case the share of labour is not fixed, it has fallen over time. The EU 
average labour share is very far from the actual share in the case of Ireland. 
In addition, the EU Commission estimate the labour input consistent with 
a stable rate of inflation. However, this methodology is highly questionable 
when applied to Ireland because of the elasticity of labour supply through 
migration. Finally, Total Factor Productivity is measured by a moving 
average process which will have major difficulties handling a recession as 
deep as the current one. For all of these reasons the EU methodology is 
not really appropriate when applied to the Irish economy. 
 
A second way of characterising the production technology of an 
economy is as a cost function. Theory shows that under a range of 
maintained assumptions, for any production function there exists a cost 
function that represents the same technology (is dual to it). A cost function 
describes how the factors of production can be combined to produce a 
given level of output at minimum cost. Firms are then assumed to 
maximise profits through choosing the appropriate level of output in 
Ireland. This measure of potential output is implemented in this paper 
using the HERMES macroeconomic model of the Irish economy. Eight of 
the eleven productive sectors of the economy represented in the model are 
characterised by an individual cost function. For a given set of factor prices 
these cost functions describe the least cost combination of inputs to 
produce a given output. The optimal or potential output is that which 
maximises the profitability of the firms producing in each sector. In the 
short run the technology assumes that capital is fixed and firms optimise 
their mix of inputs to produce the desired level of output. In the long run 
firms adjust the capital stock to minimise the long-run cost of producing 
their optimal level of output. 
 
A third method developed, and used in the 1970s, assumed that the 
maximum levels of output actually observed in each cycle of the economy 
represented the maximum potential output at that point in time (Kenny, 
1995). The potential output in intervening periods was derived by 
interpolation. However, this methodology suffered from major problems 
because of the need to project the growth in potential output beyond the 
last peak to cover the current period. 
 
A fourth simple approach takes a moving average of past output to 
determine the trend or potential output. However, such methods also 
suffer from the problem that past behaviour may not be a good indicator 
of the potential output of the economy in the future, especially when the 
endowment of labour and capital are changing rapidly. 
 
For these reasons we believe that the approach used in this paper using 
the HERMES model of the Irish economy provides a better guide to the 
potential output of the Irish economy. It does have the disadvantage that it 
is based on a large model of the economy which is difficult to summarise. 
However, it takes account of the endogeneity of the labour supply through 
migration and also of the fact that wage rates and other factor prices are 
also endogenous. 
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 Rather similar results can be derived using a simple decomposition of the 
contribution to the growth rate by the different factors of production. As 
indicated above, this assumes a simple production function for the 
economy and underlies the approach to measuring potential output used by 
a number of authorities, including the EU Commission. In this example, 
the productive capital stock is taken to exclude the stock of housing. To 
allow for the fact that unemployed labour represents a potential resource 
we use the growth in the labour force rather than the growth in actual 
employment. We also allow for the impact of the increasing human capital 
of the labour force (see Durkan, Fitzgerald and Harmon, 1999; Bergin and 
Kearney, 2007 and Fitz Gerald (ed.), 2008). 
Alternative 
Estimate of 
Potential 
Output 
  
In this case the contribution of productive capital (excluding housing) 
and labour (here taken to be the labour force) are weighted by their actual 
shares in value added. The results for this measure are shown in Table A1. 
This application of the methodology differs from that of the EU 
Commission in a number of ways. In particular, where we assume varying 
weights for the different factors of production the EU assumes constant 
shares applicable to the EU as a whole rather than just to Ireland. 
Table A1: Production Function Measure of Potential Output 
           
 
1970-
75 
1975-
80 
1980-
85 
1985-
90 
1990-
95 
1995-
00 
2000-
05 
2005-
10 
2010-
15 
2015-
20 
Capital  1.3 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.7 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 
Labour Force 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.6 1.3 0.7 0.2 0.4 
Human Capital 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
TFP smoothed 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Total contribution 4.5 5.2 4.3 3.4 4.5 6.9 5.5 4.2 3.4 3.8 
GDP 4.8 5.3 1.8 3.6 4.2 9.3 5.5 0.3 5.7 3.2 
Index 0.98 0.99 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.97 0.97 0.80 0.89 0.87 
           
 
In this case Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is not the actual rate of 
TFP observed in each period. Instead we have used smoothed values 
which roughly reflect the averages for two different periods of growth. For 
the period up to 2000, when the economy was catching up with the rest of 
the EU-15, it was quite high. However, we assume that post 2000 the rate 
has been halved. However, what is not taken account of in this Table is the 
permanent loss of output the economy has suffered as a result of the 
current recession. 
 
When the contributions of the different factors (including TFP) are 
added they do not sum to the actual growth in GDP. This reflects the fact 
that over the last thirty years the economy experienced periods of growth 
above potential and periods when it grew below potential. This is captured 
in the Index at the bottom of the table (set to be identical for 1995-00 to 
the average of the Index used in Figure 2 in the paper). The permanent loss 
of output as a result of the current recession sees the Index remaining 
around 0.9 in the period 2010-20.  
 
This treatment differs from that in Figure 2 of the paper where the 
permanent loss of output is taken into account by reducing the potential 
growth rate of the economy for the period 2005-20. Thus the Index using 
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the methodology in this Appendix remains around 0.9 in the long run 
because of the permanent loss of output) whereas the Index using the 
more sophisticated approach in the paper returns to unity.  However, they 
tell the same underlying story. 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: 
GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS 
Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
 
 Climate change is the problem that tops the environmental agenda. 
Ireland has signed up to ambitious international agreements on greenhouse 
gas emission reduction. A carbon tax on transport and home heating fuels 
may be introduced in the foreseeable future. Any excess emissions over the 
target will have to be made good by buying permits from abroad. Climate 
policy is thus closely related to fiscal policy. Therefore, this box projects 
emissions of greenhouse gases.16 
 
We assume that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) will continue 
unreformed after 2012; that a carbon tax will be levied on all carbon 
dioxide emissions that are outside the ETS; and that the carbon tax will be 
€20 per tonne of CO2 in 2010 and all following years. 
 
Figure B1 shows carbon dioxide emissions by sector. See also Table B1. 
In 2009, carbon dioxide emissions are projected to fall by 8.2 per cent 
followed by a further fall of 5.6 per cent in 2010. Construction (including 
cement production) takes the biggest hit with a fall in emissions of one-
third in 2009, but services and power generation are also down by some 10 
per cent per year. After 2011, emissions start to grow again, by 3.0 per cent 
in 2011 and 2.1 per cent in 2012. Construction, driven by the National 
Development Plan, bounces back particularly rapidly.  Between 2013 and 
2020, we project an average growth rate of 1.9 per cent. 
 
Figure B2 and Table B1 show the other greenhouse gases as well. The 
economic recession is muted in agriculture, the main source of methane 
and nitrous oxide. The same holds for pharmaceuticals and semiconductor 
manufacturing. As a result, the decline in total greenhouse gas emission is 
5.7 per cent in 2009 and 3.7 per cent in 2010, much less than the drop in 
 
16 Emissions are projected using Ireland’s Sustainable Development Model (ISus), version 
0.3. The model uses a mix of techniques ranging from simple extrapolation of trends in 
emission intensities (e.g., for HFCs emissions) to detailed behavioural modelling (e.g., for 
waste and electricity). See http://www.esri.ie/research/research_areas/environment/isus/ 
for the model documentation. 
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carbon dioxide emissions. After 2010, emissions start growing again at an 
average rate of 1.3 per cent until 2020. 
 
The recession implies that Ireland will almost comply with its short-
term obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. Cumulated over the period 
2008-2012, emissions exceed the target by 5.9 million metric tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2eq). At the futures prices of April 21, 
2009, €81 million will need to be spent on permit imports, substantially less 
than the €270 million reserved for this purpose in the carbon fund. 
 
Because emissions are projected to resume growth in 2011, Ireland is 
not likely to meet its target under the EU agreements for 2020, which call 
for a reduction of emissions by 20 per cent from their 2005 level. The 
projected distance to target is 14.2 MMTCO2eq.17 As the price of carbon 
permits may well rise to €40/tCO2 in 2020, this implies that €570 million 
would need to be spent on permit imports, €450 million of which would 
fall on the Exchequer. 
 
Table B1 also shows that the carbon tax would raise €480 million in 
2010 rising to €500 million in 2012. 
 
Figure B3 compares these projections to the ones in the Medium-Term 
Review 2008-2015 (Fitz Gerald et al., 2008) and to the latest projections by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).18 This publication uses more 
recent data, so it starts to deviate from the MTR in 2006. The gap between 
the two projections starts to grow rapidly in 2008 and reaches its peak in 
2010 with a difference of 8.7 MMTCO2eq, or 12.4 per cent below the MTR 
projection. After 2010, the two projections converge again with a gap of 
only 3.4 MMTCO2eq. 
 
Our latest projections (62.7 MMTCO2eq on average for 2008-2012) are 
slightly below the latest EPA projections with additional measures (64.1 
MMTCO2eq) and substantially below the EPA projection with measures (67.6 
MMTCO2eq).19 For 2020, our projection (64.1 MMTCO2eq) is in between 
the two EPA projections (61.0 MMTCO2eq and 70.5 MMTCO2eq) but closer 
to the with measures one. 
 
17 This gap has been substantially reduced from the figure of 17.6 MMTCO2eq as projected 
in Fitz Gerald et al. (2008). 
18http://www.epa.ie/downloads/pubs/air/airemissions/GHG_Emission_Proj_08_12 
_300 32009.pdf 
19 EPA projections with measures include only announced policies and targets, while EPA 
projections with additional measures also consider draft policies and targets. The ESRI 
projections only considers policies, disregarding targets that are not backed up by policy 
measures, but includes likely yet unannounced policies such as a carbon tax. 
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Table B1: Emissions of Carbon Dioxide by Sector and Emissions of Other Greenhouse Gases 
for Selected Years as Observed (1990, 2005) and As Projected (Other Years); 
Emission Targets; Emissions by Regulation (ETS v non-ETS); Carbon Tax Revenue 
and Value of Permit Imports. All Values are in Million Metric Tonnes of Carbon 
Dioxide Equivalent, Except the Tax Revenue and Permit Imports Which are in Million 
Euro 
         
 1990 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2020 
Carbon dioxide         
   Agriculture and food 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 
   Construction (incl. cement) 2.5 4.9 4.0 2.7 2.4 2.9 3.8 5.5 
   Manufacturing 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.4 6.7 
   Services 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 
   Power generation 10.9 15.1 13.7 12.6 11.2 11.6 10.4 9.9 
   Transport 5.0 12.8 13.1 12.2 11.7 11.9 12.5 16.0 
   Households 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.2 
Total carbon dioxide 32.5 47.7 46.0 42.2 39.9 41.1 41.9 48.9 
   Methane 13.4 13.2 12.9 12.9 12.9 12.8 12.6 11.7 
   Nitrous oxide 9.5 8.7 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.7 6.9 
   Halocarbons 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.3 3.0 
Total greenhouse gases 55.5 70.3 67.8 63.9 61.6 62.7 63.5 70.5 
Target   62.7 62.7 62.7 62.7 62.7 56.3 
Distance to target   5.1 1.2 -1.1 0.0 0.8 14.2 
ETS (CO2) 14.0 21.3 19.4 17.1 15.4 16.4 16.4 19.4 
Non-ETS (CO2) 18.7 26.0 26.0 24.6 24.0 24.1 25.0 29.5 
Non-ETS (other GHG) 23.0 22.6 21.8 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.6 21.6 
Carbon tax revenue     479 482 500 591 
Permit import   73 11 -13 0 9 569 
         
 
 
  APPENDIX 2 57 
Figure B1: Carbon Dioxide Emissions Per Sector as Observed (1990-
2007) and as Projected (2008-2020) 
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Figure B2: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Per Gas as Observed (1990-2007) 
and As Projected (2008-2020); and the Emissions Targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol and the Burden Sharing Agreement 
of the European Union 
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Figure B3: Alternative Projections of Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
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